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Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc:
Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests and the
Federal Tax Lien
Steve R. Johnson*
Important values often clash when the Internal Revenue Service proceeds
against jointly owned property to satisfy tax debts.' On the one hand, the
federal government has a legitimate revenue interest: In a time of acute
budgetary stress, effective collection of taxes is imperative. Moreover,
fairness to other taxpayers bears on the matter. Were some of the delinquent
owner's tax liabilities to go uncollected for failure to act against her interest
in joint property, that shortfall would-one way or another-have to be made
up by the rest of the country's taxpayers. On the other hand, the co-owners
who do not owe taxes should not have their interests in joint property unduly
compromised by tax collection against the delinquent owner. In addition,
since the form of joint ownership will have been established under state law,
concerns of federalism come into play.
An instance of these clashing interests is the extent to which the federal
tax lien attaches to tenancy-by-the-entireties property. Forty-five years ago,
a federal appellate court likened entireties interests to "the morning fog rising
from the valley" and held that the federal tax lien does not attach to such
interests when only one of the cotenants owes taxes.2 This decision and others
reaching the same result were premised on state law limits on the rights of
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
B.A., St. Francis College; J.D., New York University. The author wishes to thank
Douglass Boshkoff, Ronald Campbell, Daniel Conkle, Benjamin de Luna, Monica
Howland, Bruce Markell, W.R. McCants, Willam Popkin, and Lauren Robel for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. The difficulty of the area is illustrated by two leading Supreme Court
decisions: United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985) (IRS
levy on joint bank account when only one of the depositors owed taxes), and United
States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983) (sale of homestead property when only one of
the spouses owed taxes). In both cases, the Supreme Court held for the IRS, reversing
circuit court decisions. Both decisions were 5-4, however, and the majority and
dissenting blocks fitted no apparent pattern. For example, Justice Blackmun authored
the dissent in Rodgers and wrote the majority opinion in National Bank of Commerce;
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Rodgers and dissented in NationalBank
of Commerce; and only one Justice (Justice Stevens) joined in the dissents in both
cases.
2. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951).
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creditors to proceed against entireties property,3 limits existing in about one-
third of American jurisdictions. Despite substantial evolution of federal tax
lien law in the years since, the old cases were followed without exception until
quite recently and remain, even today, overwhelmingly the majority position
of the courts.
This rule-the tenancy-by-the-entiretiesbarto tax collection-is unsound.
It inadequately reconciles the interests at stake, and it is inconsistent with the
modem understanding of the nature and reach of the federal tax lien.
This article recommends that the bar be abrogated. In place of the old
rule, the article proposes that the federal tax lien should attach to entireties
property, but only to the extent of the lesser of (1) the debtor tenant's tax
liabilities or (2) the value of the debtor tenant's interest in the property.
The article has five parts. Part I describes the origins of the entireties bar
and the principal rationales on which it is based.
Parts II, III, and IV criticize the bar. They suggest that the key bar cases
likely were wrong when decided-both as a matter of policy and
doctrinally-and that subsequent developments have revealed the errors of
these cases more glaringly.
Specifically, Part II maintains that the bar cases undervalue the national
interest in prompt and effective revenue collection. The bar cases relegate the
federal government to the collection remedies available under state law to
ordinary, private creditors. This approach is at odds with Congress'
constitutional prerogative to make rules governing the laying and collection
of taxes, and it frustrates the federal government's ability to collect assessed
taxes. Indeed, the bar creates the opportunity for tax abuse: The bar can be
used as "audit insurance" to shield underreporting of tax liability. Such
revenue reduction and tax abuse are particularly undesirable in light of the
severely strained condition of the federal budget.
Part III suggests that the bar cases improperly balance considerations of
fairness to and among taxpayers. Those cases are explained in part by a
fairness concern: fear that allowing attachment of the federal tax lien to
entireties interests would unduly prejudice the nondebtor spouse. However,
the legitimate interests of nondebtor spouses can be protected without the bar.
Moreover, the bar creates its own kind of unfairness: For tax collection
purposes, it puts entireties taxpayers in a privileged position relative to all
other taxpayers in the country. Thus, the bar undercuts the important policy
that taxpayers be treated equally by our tax system.
Part IV argues that the bar cases misconstrue the established rule as to the
role of state law in federal tax lien analysis. Under that rule, one first looks
to state law to ascertain what powers over property the taxpayer possesses;
then, one looks to federal law to determine what tax consequences attach to
3. Id.
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those powers, including whether the federal tax lien attaches. The bar cases
misapply both aspects of the rule: They inappropriately apply formalities of
title over realities of control when ascertaining what powers over property
exist and they superimpose state debtor-creditor rules onto federal rules,
inappropriately limiting the broad rule of lien attachment under federal tax.
law. These erroneous applications of the established rule by the bar cases are
inconsistent with the teaching of the Supreme Court in two major tax
collection decisions.
The desirability of ending the entireties bar having been established, Part
V considers how best to achieve this result. It notes that a number of recent
decisions provide a basis from which general judicial repudiation of the
entireties bar could eventuate. Nonetheless, Part V concludes that, although
continued judicial erosion of the entireties bar would be desirable, legislation
holds more promise as the means by which to finally abolish the bar. Part V
also addresses important "second generation" issues that overthrowing the
entireties bar would raise.
I. ORiGINS OF THE ENTIRETIES BAR
A. The Tax Collection Process
Federal tax collection proceeds through several phases. First, the tax
liability must be properly assessed, and the IRS must make notice and demand
upon the taxpayer for payment.4 Thereupon, the amount assessed "shall be a
lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property"
belonging to the tax delinquent.5
If the liability is not otherwise satisfied, the IRS will proceed to enforce
collection. As to jointly owned property, two principal collection options are:
(1) administrative seizure and sale of only the delinquent co-owner's interest
in the property' and (2) judicial sale of the entire property with pro rata
division of the proceeds among all the co-owners, the IRS standing in the
shoes of the delinquent co-owner to the extent of his unpaid tax liabilities.7
4. I.R.C. §§ 6201(a), 6203 & 6303(a) (1994).
5. LR.C. § 6321 & § 6322 (1994). The § 6321 lien is known as the general tax
lien since it applies to all assessed taxes. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code
provides for a variety of special liens limited to particular contexts. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 6324(a) (1994) (special lien for estate taxes) and § 6324(b) (1994) (special lien for
gift taxes).
6. I.R.C. § 6331 (1994).
7. 1.RLC. § 7403 (1994).
1995]
MISSOURILAW REVIEW[
These and other collection techniques can be applied only to property to
which the federal tax lien has attached. The reach of that lien, therefore, is
of crucial significance.
B. Tenancies by the Entireties
Tenancies by the entireties developed as part of the English feudal system
to serve military organization and male supremacy.
The exigencies of feudalism demanded that the functions of ownership be
vested in males, presumably capable of bearing arms inwar. Womenwere
lightly regarded legally, and especially married women-whose very
identities, in most respects, were considered merged and lost in the
personalities of their husbands.... Man and wife were one and the one
was male.8
These exigencies explain an important attribute of entireties estates.
Originally, and largely still today, neither entireties spouse could partition,
alienate, or encumber the property without the other spouse's consent.' As
a consequence, entireties property was not answerable to creditors for the
separate debts of one of the spouses. 1° This attribute flowed naturally from
the common law's distaste for dividing tenures. Such division broke up feudal
services among the various tenants, rendering more tenuous the connection
between the lord and his vassals."
8. Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEI&. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951). In
addition to these exigencies, there was a religious aspect. After describing the creation
of Eve, the Bible ordains that man and wife "shall be one flesh." Genesis 2:24.
Tenancies by the entireties developed from this Biblical declaration. United States v.
Gurley, 415 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1969).
The anti-wife character of entireties estates is not purely ancient history. For
example, Massachusetts entireties estates created before 1980 (but still in legal force
and effect) have been described thusly: "The wife, in short, has no functioning rights
inthe property during her husband's lifetime." Geiselmanv. United States, 961 F.2d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
9. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 183-84 (5th ed. 1773); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMmCAN LAW
359-60 (2d ed. 1832).
10. See, e.g., Proceedings of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section, ABA
82-84 (1944) (adding: "The most objectionable aspect of the tenancy is the
opportunity it affords for frustrating the rights of creditors of one spouse.").
11. See, e.g., Femande R.V. Duffly, The Effect of the State Equal Rights
Amendment on Tenancy by the Entirety, 64 MASS. L. Rnv. 205, 206 (1979). Although
feudalism was principally a system of land tenures, most American jurisdictions
recognizing tenancies by the entireties permit both personal and real property to be
[Vol. 60
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Tenancies by the entireties were received into the law of the American
colonies, later the states, although their popularity subsequently suffered some
erosion. England abolished entireties tenancies in 1925.12 In the United
States, the progressive recognition of women's property rights, beginning with
the nineteenth century Married Women's Property Acts, caused some western
states never to adopt the tenancy-by-the-entireties form and caused some other
states to abolish or restrict it. 3 Numerous judges 4 and commentators 5
have called for ending tenancies by the entireties where they continue to exist.
Nonetheless, every American lawyer knows the facility of our legal
system for discovering new rationales for familiar fornhs whose original
purposes have passed, or for retaining such forms out of little but inertia. So,
a substantial number of American jurisdictions have retained tenancies by the
entireties.
For purposes of this article, these jurisdictions divide into two groups.
Sixteen American jurisdictions (the "bar states" or "full bar states") provide
that the liens of separate creditors cannot attach to entireties property or
interests. Another ten jurisdictions (the "modified bar states") provide that the
liens of separate creditors can attach but subject to the rights of the nondebtor
spouse, i.e., that the underlying property held by the entireties estate cannot
be levied on until the nondebtor spouse's rights cease to be absolute, such as
upon the termination of the entireties estate by death or divorce. 6
held by such tenancies. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK &
DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 207 (2d ed. 1993).
12. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 2, § 37 (1925) (Eng.).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD R. POwELL, 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 620[3]
(Patrick J. Rohan rev. ed. 1993).
14. "The estate by the entireties is a remnant of other times.... To me the
conception is quite incomprehensible." King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49, 60 (N.J. 1959)
(Weintraub, C.J., dissenting); Kemer v. McDonald, 84 N.W. 92, 92 (Neb. 1900) ("It
would seem clear that, taking the modem view of the marriage relation, there is no
reason for the doctrine of estates in entirety .... "); see also CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 219 (2d ed. 1988) (Tenancy by the
entireties' "underlying concept of an artificial unity of husband and wife is repugnant
to modem views of the status of married women.").
15. See, e.g., Duffly, supra note 11, at 205; Phipps, supra note 8, at 26
(referring to the "absurd theory of unity between spouses"); C. J. Messerschmidt,
Comment, Beall v. Beall-The Effect of One Spouse's Death on an Offer To Sell
Property Held as Tenants by the Entireties, 42 MD. L. REv. 508, 515 (1983); Note,
Effect of the Married Women's Property Acts upon Estates by the Entirety, 37 HARV.
L. REv. 616 (1924); Proceedings of Real Property, supra note 10, at 82-84.
16. The sixteen full bar jurisdictions are Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Ohio (for entireties estates created before 1985 only), Pennsylvania, the Virgin Islands,
1995]
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C. Entireties Bar to Tax Collection
Under the currently prevailing view, the federal tax lien is hostage to
whatever entireties regime exists in the taxpayer's state. The IRS as a tax
creditor is held to the same limitations that bind private creditors. So, in the
ten modified bar states, the tax lien attaches to entireties property but subject
to the nondebtor spouse's rights in the property," and, in the sixteen full bar
states, the tax lien does not attach at all to entireties property and entireties
interests. Because of their greater number, greater population, and greater
limitation on the tax lien, the full bar states present the greater problem and
are the principal focus of this article.
Although there were a few earlier trial court decisions to the same
effect,'8 the view that, in the bar states, the federal tax lien does not extend
to entireties property when only one of the spouses owes taxes rests on a triad
of 1950s federal appellate court cases: United States v. Hutcherson,'
Raffaele v. Granger," and United States v. American National Bank.2"
In the 1951 Hutcherson case, the court framed the issue as whether one
spouse's interest in entireties property "is such an interest to which any lien
can attach," a matter to be ascertained "by the application of the law of
Missouri determining and defining the law of property rights in that state."2
Three related strands of thought appear in the somewhat discursive and
occasionally lyrical opinion:
Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming. The ten modified bar jurisdictions are Alaska,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 13, 620[4]; J.H. Cooper,
Annotation, Interest of Spouse in Estate by Entireties as Subject to Satisfaction of His
or Her ndividual Debt, 75 A.L.R. 2D 1172 (1961). The Virgin Islands is omitted by
the above sources but is a full barjurisdiction. E.g., Masonry Prods., Inc. v. Tees, 280
F. Supp. 654 (D.V.L 1968).
17. Geiselmanv. United States, 961 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1992); United States
v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 916-17 (D.N.J. 1995); United States v. Brynes, 848 F.
Supp. 1096, 1099 (D.R.I. 1994); United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613 (W.D.
Tenn. 1962); Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1960); United States
v. Kaplan, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH-) 9532 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
18. See United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mich. 1945); Shaw
v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mich. 1939); Smith v. Commissioner, 24
B.T.A. 807, 811-13 (1931).
19. 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951) (Missouri law).
20. 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952) (Pennsylvania law).
21. 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1958) (Florida law), cert. denied as to another issue,
358 U.S. 835 (1959).
22. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d at 328.
[Vol. 60
TENANCY-BY-THE-EN7RETIES INTERESTS
(1) Near the end of the opinion, the court declared: "[T]he interest of
one spouse in the estate by the entirety in Missouri is not a right to property
or property in any sense."'
(2) That declaration, however, is in tension with a prior portion of the
opinion. There, the court quoted extensively from Missouri cases holding that
each spouse is "vested with the entire estate," that "each owns, not a part...
but the whole" of the property.2 4 In this light, the court's argument is not
that there is no property interest at all, but only that that property interest is
an undivided interest, not a separate interest.
(3) At yet other places, the court intimated that, whatever the nature of
the property right at issue, it was not a right "to which a lien may attach."'
The reason was that, under Missouri law, the entireties estate "has retained the
characteristic of immunity," i.e., that state law prevented creditors of one
spouse from attaching or levying on entirety property to satisfy the separate
debts of one of the spouses.26 Thus, the Hutcherson court rhapsodized:
Under Missouri law the individual interest of the husband or wife in an
estate by the entirety is, like the rainbow in the sky or the morning fog
rising from the valley, not such an estate as may be subjected to the grasp
of an attaching creditor or which will permit the adherence thereto of a tax
lien."
In the following year, 1952, the issue was addressed in Raffaele. The
court reached the same result although with only passing reference to
Hutcherson and on different grounds. The Raffaele court reasoned that one
person's property may not be taken to satisfy a different person's tax liability
and that allowing the Service to proceed against entireties property would
permit just that, "whether [the Service's] attack be viewed as an invasion of
property of the wife or of title vested in 'a distinct legal entity, consisting of
the unified personalities of the husband and wife'."
28
Completing the triad was the 1958 decision in American National Bank,
which noted Raffaele in passing but relied more heavily on Hutcherson.29
The American National Bank court conceded that federal tax liens and their
enforcement are matters of federal law, but it added: "[T]he rules of property.
23. Id. at 331.
24. Id. at 329.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 330.
27. Id. at 331.
28. Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 623 (citation omitted).
29. American National Bank, 255 F.2d at 507.
1995]
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and [the] fixing of the incidents [of] property ownership are rules of state law
which the Federal courts will respect."3
The court,' "[w]hile refraining from concurrence in dicta regarding
rainbows and fogs," agreed with Hutcherson's result, on the conclusory
ground that the delinquent spouse "did not have any interest in the subject
property during [the other spouse's] lifetime to which a lien for Federal taxes,
owed by him but not by her, could attach."'"
Nearly all subsequent decisions have followed the 1950s triad.32
Accordingly, the currently prevailing view is that, in the bar states, the federal
tax lien does not attach to entireties property when only one spouse owes
taxes.33 None of the post-1950s cases, however, has added to the analysis,
and none has reviewed the triad in light of the evolution of tax lien law since
the 1950s.
If. UNDERVALUING THE NATIONAL NTEREST IN REVENUE
COLLECTION
Our country is now engaged in the latest round of the perennial debate
about the proper role and size of the federal government. Whatever will
result, it is safe to say that Americans have expected, and for the foreseeable
future likely will expect, the federal government to shoulder an imposing array
of responsibilities, both here and abroad. To do so, the government needs
money, most of which comes from taxes. Thus, as the Supreme Court has
30. Id. at 506-07.
31. Id. at 507.
32. See, e.g., Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1971)
(Michigan); Bensonv. United States, 442 F.2d 1221, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum;
District of Columbia); Batrus, Foldenauer & Madigan, Inc. v. United States, 29
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 72-629 (E.D. Va. 1972) (Virginia); Pettengill v. United States,
205 F.Supp. 10, 13 (D. Vt. 1962) (Vermont). But see Part V.A below.
33. Despite the bar, there are atleasttwo situations inwhich the IRS can pursue
entireties property. First, if both spouses owe taxes, the tax lien will attach to
entireties property up to the amount of whichever spouse's liability is the less. E.g.,
Tony Thornton Auction Service, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 637-38 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. Eglinton, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,322 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Whittaker v. Kavanagh, 100 F. Supp. 918, 920 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
Second, if one spouse, while already owing taxes, transfers his formerly separate
property into entirety status, the government can pursue the property (or its monetary
equivalent) through fraudulent conveyance or transferee liabilitytheories. AEg.,Alonzo
v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 577 (1982); United States v. Ream, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9703 (M.D. 1967).
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repeatedly recognized, "taxes are the life-blood of government, and their
prompt and certain availability an imperious need."34
Of course, this fact does not mean that the IRS should win every case.
When Congress has chosen not to impose tax or has chosen to forgo collection
in particular circumstances, the courts must honor that choice. The other side
of the coin, however, is that courts should not, through their decisions, create
rules of exemption without carefully considering their impact on the
government's legitimate revenue collection interests.
The bar cases are wanting in this respect. Fundamental to them is
imposing on the federal government as a tax creditor the same restrictions
state law imposes on ordinary creditors. But the IRS and ordinary creditors
are not the same. They derive their collection rights from different sources,
and the effects on society when they are unable to collect amounts owed to
them are different.
United States v. Rodgers 5 is instructive in this regard. Texas law
restricted the ability of private creditors to reach homestead property, and the
lower courts would have applied these limits against the IRS as well.36 The
Supreme Court held to the contrary, rejecting the notion that the IRS "should
not have any right, superior to that of other creditors, to disturb the settled
expectations of innocent third parties."37 It observed:
In fact, however, the Government's right [to proceed against] the entire
property in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest does not arise out
of its privileges as an ordinary creditor, but out of the express terms of [the
Internal Revenue Code]. Moreover, the use of the power granted by [the
Code] is not the act of an ordinary creditor, but the exercise of a sovereign
prerogative, incident to the power to enforce the obligations of the
delinquent taxpayer himself, and ultimately grounded in the constitutional
mandate to "lay and collect taxes."3
34. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935); see e.g., United States v.
Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 604 (1990); United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472
U.S. 713, 733 (1985). "That collection of taxes is vital to the functioning, indeed
existence, of government cannot be denied." United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715, 734 (1979).
35. 461 U.S. 677 (1983). For fuller discussionof Rodgers, see infra notes 137-
159 and accompanying text.
36: Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; amend. XVI); see also United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209-10 (1983) ("The enforcement
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code... do grant to the Service powers to enforce
its tax liens that are greater than those possessed by private secured creditors under
state law.").
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The entireties bar compromises the government's ability to "lay and
collecttaxes." In all cases in which the delinquent spouse's assessed liabilities
exceed the sum of his separate assets, the bar-by putting that spouse's
interest in entireties property off-limits to the Service-will prevent collection
of assessed taxes. Although the government has not published statistics on
such revenue loss, the number of the jurisdictions featuring the bar and the
populous nature of some of them suggest that such loss is appreciable. 9
This revenue concern is heightened by the fact that motivated taxpayers
can deliberately structure their affairs and manipulate the entireties bar to
avoid paying tax. The Supreme Court already has recognized the possibility
of tax abuse in the joint ownership context. In United States v. National Bank
of Commerce," the Court upheld the Service's ability to levy on joint bank
accounts even though only one of the three codepositors owed taxes and it was
unclear what percentage of the sums in the accounts he owned. The Court
supported its holding in part by noting that, were joint accounts beyond the
Service's reach, "it would be easy for a delinquent taxpayer to evade, or at
least defer, his obligation by placing his funds in joint bank accounts. 41
The entireties bar creates a similar highway for abuse. Take an
illustration involving the income tax. The spouses transfer all their
assets-including formerly separatelyowned assets-into entireties ownership.
Then, in subsequent years, they file separate income tax returns. The higher-
income spouse takes aggressive return positions greatly reducing her reported
tax due, and the lower-income spouse reports and pays his correct tax liability.
The money saved by the higher-income spouse is used to finance personal
consumption, not to acquire any assets capable of sale. Any costs of or
improvements to entireties property (such as home mortgage expenses) are met
out of income from entireties property (such as interest on entireties bank
accounts or dividends on entireties stock)42 or out of any separate resources
of the lower-income spouse.
Through such an arrangement, the spouses would have, in effect, used the
entireties bar as audit insurance. If the Service audits the higher-income
spouse and challenges the aggressive positions, the Service would do itself
39. See supranote 17 and accompanying text. Even in the 1950s, the issuewas
significant. See I.R.S. Action onDec. CC-1957-406 (June 19, 1957) ("the question of
tenancy by the entireties versus the Federal tax lien is one of frequent occurrence and
considerable importance [in the bar states]"). If anything, the issue is of greater
importance today.
40. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
41. Id. at 733. For fuller discussion of National Bank of Commerce, see infra
notes 159-178 and accompanying text.
42. Inmost entiretiesjurisdictions, personalproperty aswell asreal property can
be held by the entireties. See supra note 11.
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little good-deficiencyassessments against that spouse would be uncollectible.
That spouse has no separate assets of her own against which collection could
be effected, and the Service-having an assessment against one spouse
only-could not proceed against the entireties property. At the cost of
perhaps slightly higher tax paid by the lower-income spouse,43 the couple
would have rendered the aggressive, higher-income spouse audit-proof.44
Thus, the entireties bar improperly equates the IRS to private creditors;
it decreases the government's ability to collect assessed but unpaid taxes; and
it creates an avenue for tax abuse, a scheme by which to obtain "audit
insurance" for tax underreporting.
These concerns may have been somewhat less pressing when the key bar
cases were decided in the 1950s than they are now. For example, in 1956 (the
first year for which the federal government used unified budget concepts) the
federal budget had a surplus of more than $4 billion, while in 1993 the federal
budget had a deficit of more than $254 billion.45 The IRS's inability to
collect assessed taxes is part of the problem.46 Thus, the fact that the
43. Married-filing-separately rates are higher than married-filing-jointly rates.
Compare I.R.C. § l(a) (1994) with I.R.C. § l(d) (1994). This would be largely
irrelevant to the higher-income spouse if she can sufficiently slash her taxes through
aggressive positions, and it would matter little to the other spouse if his taxable income
,is low.
44. The Service might attempt to assert that the lower-income spouse is liable
as a transferee for the higher-income spouse's deficiencies. See I.R.C. § 6901 (1994).
Were the Service successful, it would have assessments against both the spouses,
enabling it to proceed against the entireties property. See supra note 33.
However, it is far from certain that the Service would be successful. Transfers
prior to the tax year of the deficiency commonly cannot give rise to transferee liability.
See, e.g., Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54, 58 (1957). Moreover, if the other
spouse also transferred separate assetsinto entireties form, there might be consideration
for the higher-income spouse's transfers, obviating transferee liability. See, e.g.,
Gumm v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 475, 480 (1989), affd without opinion, 933 F.2d
1014 (9th Cir. 1991) (absence or inadequacy of consideration is an element of
transferee liability).
45. U.S. Dm'r. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERv., 1995
INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 73.
46. According to the General Accounting Office, between 1990 and 1994, the
gross inventory of tax debt grew from $87 billion to $156 billion (nearly an 80%
increase) while annual collections of delinquent taxes dropped from $25.5 billion to
$23.5 billion (an 8% decrease). The GAO concluded: "IRS' poor performance in
resolving tens of billions of dollars in outstanding tax delinquencies has not only
lessened the revenues immediately available to support government operations but
could also jeopardize future taxpayer compliance by leaving the impression that IRS
is neither fair nor serious about collecting overdue taxes." GAO/HR 95-6 (Feb. 23,
1995), 1995 WL 234941, at *7 (F.D.C.H.).
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entireties bar compromises the revenue interest of the federal government may
have been tolerable when the original bar cases were decided, but it is hard
to defend retaining the bar in our current period of budgetary stress.47
III. IMPROPERBALANCING OF FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS
Tax cases are principally occasions of statutory construction, and
considerations of fairness should not override the intent of Congress.4"
Nonetheless, equity often matters, whether as a stated aid in the construction
process or as a tacit element in the judge's thinking.
A fairness concern helps to explain the bar cases. The thought that
allowing the tax lien to attach to entireties property would unduly harm the
nondelinquent spouse was seen as a possible due process concern or, at least,
as a policy reason to construe the statute as not requiring lien attachment.4 9
This line of thought, while understandable, is misguided: (1) the
entireties bar is not necessary to achieve fairness for non-delinquent spouses
and (2) the bar creates its own kind of unfairness by its unequal treatment of
taxpayers.
A. Fairness to Nondelinquent Spouses
For three reasons, no severe harm to nondelinquent spouses would obtain
upon the overthrow of the entireties bar. First, the majority of married
couples in this country do not hold their property in entireties bar
form-either because their states do not recognize entireties estates at all or
because the spouses choose to use some other form of property ownership.
In those situations, even when only one spouse owes taxes, the federal tax lien
To improve the IRS's ability to collect assessed but unpaid taxes, in 1990
Congress extended the statute of limitations on collection from six years to ten years.
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11317(a), 104 Stat. 1388-458 (amending I.R.C. § 6502(a)).
Of course, that change will not materially increase collection in entireties situations as
long as the bar remains in effect.
47. While it is too early to know what will emerge from the tax-reforn fever
currently sweeping Capitol Hill, one leading proposal, Representative Anney's, would
abolish federal income tax withholding on wages. H.R. 4585, § 103, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994). Were such a change ultimately enacted, even greater fiscal importance
would attach to the IRS's being able to effectively collect taxes due and to such
collection not being hindered by limitations like the entireties bar.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611, 1623-24 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Estate of Dupree v. United States 391 F.2d 753,758 (5th
Cir. 1968); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967).
49. See, e.g., Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1952).
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does attach to the jointly owned property, at least to the extent of the
delinquent spouse's interest therein."
Thus, abolishing the entireties bar would create no new disability and no
unique hardship on nondelinquent spouses. It only would put nondelinquent
spouses once protected by the bar in the same position that nondelinquent
spouses not under bar protection always have been in. Parity with the rest of
the nation cannot be considered undue hardship.
Second, allowing the tax lien to attach to entireties interests would not,
by itself, severely prejudice nondebtor spouses. The real impact on such
spouses would come, not from mere attachment of the lien, but from sale of
the property. Typically, such sale would be pursuant to § 7403. Yet, two
aspects of § 7403 protect nondelinquent spouses from serious harm:"
(1) Section 7403 provides that a district court, on application from the
Service, "may" direct sale of the property, not that it must do so.52 This
language permits the district court to exercise a degree of equitable discretion
to deny sale when the government's revenue interest is clearly outweighed by
hardship to the nondebtor co-owner. 3
(2) If sale is ordered by the district court, it will be followed by division
of the net proceeds among the co-owners in proportion to their respective
interests in the property. Through this mechanism, the nondebtor owner
would obtain the cash equivalent of his interest in the property. While less
than complete salvation,' such compensation defeats any due process objections.5
50. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
51. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 699 (1983) ("§ 7403 is
punctilious in protecting the vested rights of third parties caught in the Government's
collection effort, and in ensuring that the Government not receive out of the proceeds
of the sale any more than that to which it is properly entitled").
52. I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1994).
53. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 705-11. In practice, some courts have chosen to
exercise this discretion adversely to the IRS. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 764
F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pilla, 711 F.2d 94, 95-96 (8th Cir.
1983); United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 917-20 (D.N.J. 1995); United States
v. Jensen, 785 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (D. Utah 1992).
54. The non-delinquent owner may prefer to hold his or her interest in a form
other than its equivalent in cash. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 704 ("we are not blind to
the fact that in practical terms financial compensationmay not always be a completely
adequate substitute for a roof over one's head"). This concern, of course, is at its
strongest when the property at stake is a residence. Most entireties jurisdictions,
however, permit personalty to be held by the entireties too. See supra note 11.
Spousal and family protection concerns are much weaker as to, say, shares of IBM
stock held in an entireties estate.
55. E.g., Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697-99; United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970). There is a similar mechanism in bankruptcy. The
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Third, if the protections of § 7403 are deemed insufficient, additional
safeguards can be crafted. As discussed in Part V.B.1, one of the virtues of
legislative abolition of the entireties bar would be flexibility.56 If it wishes,
Congress could provide that, although the tax lien attaches to entireties
interests, the Service could not seek § 7403 sale while the property remains
in entireties form. Such a moratorium could be applied to residences held by
the entireties, or, at the extreme, to all types of entireties property. Such an
approach, though not recommended by this article, would, at least, be an
improvement over the status quo and yet would be highly solicitous toward
nondebtor spouses."
B. Fairness to Other Taxpayers
An important objective of the Internal Revenue Code is that similarly
situated taxpayers be treated similarly. Our tax system is "designed to ensure
as far as possible that similarly situated taxpayers pay the same tax."58
Inequalities in administering the tax laws and discriminatory distinctions
should be avoided. 9
bankruptcy estate includes entireties interests of the debtor unless specifically excluded.
See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. The trustee may, under stated
conditions, sell the underlying property held by the entireties estate, paying over to the
nondebtor spouse the value of his or her interest in the property and retaining the
remainder in the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), (h) (1994). Tiis
procedure-generally comparable to § 7403 sale and distribution-is viewed as
adequately protecting the interest of the nondebtor spouse. See, e.g., In re Koehler,
6 B.R. 203, 204-05 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
177 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6137-38.
56. See infra notes 206-216 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
58. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir.
1980) (Oakes, J., concurring); Baumanv. United States, 106 F. Supp. 384, 388 (E.D.
Mo. 1952).
Admittedly, our tax system is not unswerving in its adherence to uniformity or,
in the language of economics, horizontal equity. For instance, the Supreme Court
rejected uniformity arguments inpermitting taxpayers in community property states to
split their incomes when taxpayers in separate property states could not, Poe v.
Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930), and, even today, married taxpayers may
experience a "marriage penalty" or a "marriage bonus" compared to single taxpayers,
compare I.R.C. § l(a) (1994) (married-filing-jointly income tax rates) with I.R.C.
§ l(c) (1994) (income tax rates for unmarried individuals).
However, pressures for uniform treatment are strong. Responding to such
pressures, Congress largely reversed the effects of Poe v. Seabom in legislation in
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The entireties bar disserves the goal of uniform application of the revenue
laws. Taxpayers who happen to be entireties cotenants in bar states are given
a privileged position relative to all other taxpayers in the country. Entireties
interests in bar states are the only type of joint ownership or joint property
interest exempt from the federal tax lien. The lien attaches to a tax
delinquent's interest in all other types of joint property.6"
Thus, at least two types of inequalities result from the entireties bar.
First, most states either do not recognize entireties estates at all or permit
creditors to proceed against entireties property to satisfy separate debts. The
tax law treats entireties cotenants in bar states preferentially compared to all
joint tenants in non-bar states. Second, even in bar states, entireties ownership
typicallyis optional with spouses, not mandatory. Within the bar jurisdictions,
the tax law treats spouses who choose entireties estates preferentially
compared to other spouses who choose to hold their property in other forms
of ownership.
Consider an illustration. Bob and Ray both have outstanding federal tax
assessments against them of $100,000; there are no outstanding assessments
against their wives. Bob resides in Georgia, a non-bar state, in a modest
home, which he and his wife own as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Bob has no other assets. Ray lives in Florida, a bar state. In addition to their
home, Ray and his wife own a $2,000,000 ocean-front vacation house. Ray
and his wife own both properties by the entireties.
Because of the bar, Bob and Ray will be treated very differently by our
tax system. The tax lien will attach to Bob's interest in his home, and the IRS
may take enforced collection action against it, through either § 6331 levy and
sale of Bob's interest or § 7403 sale of the entire home with consequent
division of proceeds.
1948 and 1969. See WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIc FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 892-
93 (4th ed. 1991). Proposals to address the rate disparities based on marital status are
regularly made. For example, a credit to partially alleviate the "marriage penalty" is
included in the tax proposals in the House Republicans' "Contract with America." See
JoiNT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DESCRIPTION OF THE
"CONTRACT WlTH AMERICA TAX RELIEF ACT OF 1995" (JCX-9-95) (Mar. 9, 1995).
Thus, despite deviations, the policy of horizontal equity is one of the driving
principles of our tax system. See, e.g., Interview with C. Eugene Steuerle, ABA SEC.
OF TAX. NEWSLETTBP, Summer 1995 at 12.
60. See, e.g., Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775, 776-77 (10th Cir. 1980)
(homestead property); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1972)
(tenancy in common); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1970)
(community property); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1968)
(property subject to dower interest); United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-03
(7th Cir. 1964) (joint tenancy). See generally MICHAEL SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 14-43 to 14-46 (2d ed. 1991).
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In contrast, as long as the bar exists, the lien will not attach to, and the
IRS could not act against, either Ray's house or Ray's vacation home. Ray
may continue to lie on the beach, fish in the surf, tan in the solarium, sip mint
juleps on the veranda, throw parties downstairs, and slumber upstairs on his
vacation property as much as he likes and as long as he likes without ever
paying his tax bill.
Bob loses his home, the taxpayers of the United States have to find
another $100,000 to make up for what Ray did not pay, and Ray lives and
vacations in luxury because he is protected by the entireties bar. The
entireties bar fosters untoward differences in how citizens are treated by our
tax system.
A defender of the entireties bar would argue that entireties ownership is
different from other types of co-ownership, that the disparities of treatment are
not discriminatory but merely recognition of the difference. That asserted
difference would be that, unlike tenancies in common for instance, tenancies
by the entireties can be partitioned only by the mutual consent of both
cotenants.
That defense is inadequate. A cotenant's unilateral ability to partition the
property is not a prerequisite to attachment of the tax lien. The federal tax
lien attaches to all other types of undivided property interests despite the
interest-holder's inability unilaterally to partition the property."'
Thus, what purportedly makes entireties estates different should not
matter for federal tax lien purposes. There being no relevant difference in the
ownership forms, there is no warrant for the preferential treatment accorded
some taxpayers by virtue of the entireties bar.
In summary, the entireties bar, though partly motivated by considerations
of fairness, actuallyrenders our tax system less fair. The bar is not necessary
to protect the legitimate interests of nondelinquent spouses, and it results in
taxpayers being treated differently for no compelling reason.
Again, as seen with respect to revenue considerations, the failure of the
early bar cases to properly balance the fairness considerations is perhaps more
understandable than the comparable failure of subsequent bar cases. Although
the main elements of § 7403-including the language that the district court
"may" decree sale, not must decree sale-have been in the law since 1868,62
it was not until 1983 that it was settled that district courts have at least some
equitable discretion to deny sale of co-owned property when the resultant
harm to the nondebtor co-owner would exceed the resultant benefit to the
government and that the § 7403 compensation mechanism overcomes any due
process concerns.63 Thus, a fairness argument in favor of the entireties bar,
61. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
62. See Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 106, 15 Stat. 167.
63. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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while somewhat plausible when the foundational bar cases were decided, is
misplaced today.
IV. MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE PROPER ROLE OF STATE LAW IN
FEDERAL TAX LEN ANALYSIS
The revenue and fairness considerations discussed in Parts II and III are,
of course, policy arguments against the entireties bar. The bar fails on
doctrinal grounds as well: It is irreconcilable with the basic rule governing
federal tax collection issues.
The collection provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not create
property .rights, but they do attach consequences to the rights created under
state law. Those consequences are matters of federal law.'
This relationship has led to a two-part formulation governing federal tax
collection issues: First, state law is consulted to ascertain what interests the
taxpayer has; second, "'once it has been determined that state law creates
sufficient interests in the [taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [the statute],
state law is inoperative,' and the tax consequences thenceforth are dictated by
federal law."65
In varying language, the Supreme Court has invoked this rule for
generations.66 By describing the proper relation between federal law and
state law, this formulation defines the requirements of federalism in the tax
collection area.
Typically, the bar decisions have painted with broad brush and have not
attempted to delineate precisely how the bar relates to the two-part
formulation. In fact, as shown below, the bar cannot be justified under either
part. Thus, the bar conflicts with the fundamental rule governing federal tax
collection.
A. Second Part of the Formulation
This section begins with the second portion of the controlling rule
because it requires no extended discussion. As noted above, once the
64. E.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983); United States v.
Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
65. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (calling this
rule "long established"); United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291,
293-95 (1961); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960); Helvering v.
Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 162 (1942); Morganv. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940);
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
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delinquent is found to have a property interest, the tax collection consequences
that apply to that interest are matters of federal law. As to lien attachment,
federal law is clear. Under § 6321, the federal tax lien attaches to all of the
delinquent's property rights.67
State laws preventing separate creditors from reaching entireties property
cannot modify this rule of attachment. Consistent with the Supremacy
Clause,61 it is settled that state debt collection rules do not limit the federal
tax lien69 and that state exemptions and immunities do not shield taxpayers
from the federal tax lien. Examples abound. For instance, benefits under
a city retirement fund and disability payments under an insurance contract,
both exempt under state law from process of creditors, can be reached by the
IRS to satisfy the beneficiary's unpaid taxes."
Moreover, although some federal laws expressly or impliedly incorporate
state debtor-creditor rules,72 the Internal Revenue Code does not. Section
6321 provides that the federal tax lien attaches to "all property or rights to
property" of the tax debtor. 3 Certain enumerated assets are made exempt
from levy-though not from lien 74 -by § 6334(a).75  However, entireties
67. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause invalidates state rules
inconsistent with federal law whether those rules protect third parties or protect the
debtor. "[T]he Supremacy Clause-which provides the underpinning for the Federal
Government's right to sweep aside state-created exemptions in the first place-is as
potent in its application to innocent by-standers as in its application to delinquent
debtors." United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 701 (1983) (footnote omitted).
69. E.g., United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291, 293-95
(1961) (federal tax lien is not subject, even as against good-faith purchaser, to state
filing requirements); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955) (state priority
rules do not apply to federal tax collection); United States v. City of New Britian, 347
U.S. 81, 86 (1954) (same); United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S.
47, 50-51 (1950) (whether liens competing with the federal tax lien are choate is
determined under federal, not state, law).
70. E.g., United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722-23
(1985); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1971); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6334-1(c).
71. Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 504, 505-07 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957) (disability payments); United States v. Wagner, 235 F.
Supp. 854, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (retirement benefits).
72. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A), (B) (1994) (expressly incorporating such
rules into the Bankruptcy Code upon election of state); United States v. 15621 S.W.
2d Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1517 (1lth Cir. 1990) (such rules are impliedly incorporated
into federal forfeiture law).
73. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).
74. See In reVoelker, 42 F.3d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1994); WILLAM T. PLUMB,
JR., FEiERAL TAX LENs 20-21 (3d ed. 1972).
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interests are not within this enumeration, and § 6334(c) provides:
"Notwithstanding any other law of the United States . . . , no property or
rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property
specifically made exempt by subsection (a)." 6 Section 6334(c) "is specific
and it is clear and there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property
that happens to be exempt from state levy under state laws." 7
So, the second portion of the rule controlling federal tax collection issues
adverts exclusively to federal law. Federal law provides for attachment of the
tax lien to all property interests; it establishes an exclusive enumeration of
exemptproperty; and entireties interests are not within this enumeration. State
exemptions and immunities shielding entireties property neither override the
federal rules nor are incorporated into them." The entireties bar is not
justified under the second portion of the controlling rule.
B. First Part of the Formulation
In light of the foregoing, the entireties bar can be defended, if at all, only
if it fits within the first part of the controlling formulation, i.e., only if tax-
delinquent spouses do not have property interests as to assets held by the
entireties. 9 However, that case cannot be made.
75. I.R.C. § 6334(a) (1994).
76. I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1994).
77. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971); see also United States
v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 700 (1983) (it is "clearly implicit" in § 6334(c) that state
law cannot create an exemption not found in the Code); Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(c).
78. An early case argued that the bar is not an exemption for tax lien purposes.
Shaw v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 245, 246 (W.D. Mich. 1939) ("This immunity is
not an exemption but arises from the peculiar nature of the [entireties] estate.")
Shaw's discussion of this point is lamentably terse, and subsequent decisions have not
expanded on it. In any event, the Supreme Court rejected what appears to be a similar
argument in the context of homestead interests. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S.
677, 700-02 (1983) (rejecting the circuit court's view that state law limitations on the
ability of creditors to reach homestead property should be applied against the IRS
because the nature of homestead interests is not merely an exemption but also a
property right).
79. The first part of the controlling formulation actually involves two inquiries.
Initially, it is to necessary to ascertain what powers or "sticks" as to property the
taxpayer has; this inquiry is a matter of state law. Thereafter, determining whether
such powers or sticks rise to the level of being a property right is a matter of federal
law. E.g., Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945) (dictum);
United States v. Citizens & SouthernNat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 241 F.2d 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1957); Edmond N. Cahn, Local Law
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In its original, medieval conception, formal legal title to entireties
property was thought to repose in neither the wife nor the husband, but instead
in a fictive, metaphysical entity: the marital union."0 Were this view taken
seriously now, the federal tax lien arguably could not attach to entireties
property as the debtor spouse would have no interest in it.
However, the dead hand of historical formalism should not be allowed to
throttle modem tax lien law. Even at the purely formal level, the medieval
notion that the spouses, in their personal capacities, do not own entireties
property has eroded. "No interest" language occasionally still appears.
However, especially since passage of the Married Women's Property Acts,81
it is far more common for courts today-even in bar states-to acknowledge
that ownership of entireties property is personal with the spouses, not vested
in some fictive entity apart from them. Thus, the cases now usually refer to
"both" spouses or "each" spouse owning entireties property.' Even at the
purely formal level, therefore, it is too late in the day to assert that neither
spouse has an interest in property held by the entireties.
But there is a far more fundamental point. Whether entireties interests
are property interests should depend on substance-the actual burdens,
benefits, and command each spouse has as to property held in entireties
form-not on the mere formality of who is designated by local law as the
legal "owner" of the property. Once the inquiry is lodged, as it must be, at
the level of substance, it is clear that both spouses have property interests.
1. Substance over formality
It is long settled that federal tax law adverts to substance, not form.
"'Taxation should move in an atmosphere of practical realities rather than
amid the intricate and wooden concepts of local property law."'" This
in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 816 (1943).
80. E.g., 2 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
182 (5th ed. 1773).
81. See text accompanying supra note 13.
82. See, e.g., Lapp v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
('Each [spouse] owned an undivided half interest in the whole."); Wife (L.R.) v.
Husband (N.G.), 406 A.2d 34, 35 (Del. 1979) ("the wife had legal and equitable title
to an undivided interest in each [tenancy-by-the-entireties] asset"); Quick v.
Leatherman, 96 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1957) ("Each [spouse] owns and controls the
whole."); cf Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Coniglio, 787 F.2d 1484, 1488-89 (11th Cir.
1986) (when referring to a wife's interest in an entireties estate, repeatedly speaking
of "her property interests" and "her entirety interests"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987).
83. Kohnv. Commissioner, 197 F.2d480, 482 (2d Cir. 1952) (quoting Randolph
E. Paul, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rules of Property, SELECTED
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principle has been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts." Thus, ownership for federal tax purposes depends on
"command over property or enjoyment of its economic benefit," rather than
on formalities of title under local law. 5
The predominance of substance over state-created labels and formalities
is demonstrated by the fact that the federal tax lien attaches to economic rights
and interests even if the applicable state law does not classify them as property
interests. For example, in United States v. National Bank of Commerce,6 the
right to withdraw money from a bank account was not called a property right
by Arkansas law but nonetheless was held to be a sufficient property interest
for federal tax collection purposes."
Also, in several contexts, states grant persons licenses to operate certain
kinds of businesses but state law expressly provides that these licenses are not
"property," but only "privileges." Becausefederaltax law looks through state-
created labels and adverts to the actualities of the economic benefit conferred,
however, such "privileges" are considered "property or rights to property" for
§ 6321 purposes and the federal tax lien attaches to them.?
In emphasizing not labels but rights to direct or prevent particular uses
of assets, the substance-based approach of the tax law fits well with our
modem understanding of property. Property law has long since moved past
the simplistic identification of "property" as some tangible, physical thing.
Now, the familiar metaphor is that "property" is a "bundle of sticks," each
stick constituting a right to do something or to prevent something from being
done. In a leading gift tax case, the Supreme Court instructed: "'Property'
STUDIES IN F-DERAL TAXATION 1, 21 (2d Ser. 1938)).
84. E.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604-05 (1948); Corliss v.
Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) (Holmes, J., writing for a unanimous Court); In re
Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990) (A state "cannot
thwart the operation of the Tax Code by classifying the interests it has created as
something other than property rights."), cert. deniedsub nom., Ohio Dep't of Revenue
v. IRS, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370, 390 (1979).
85. Speca v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1980); see, e.g., Cates
v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1387, 1388-90 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Boykinv. Commissioner,
344 F.2d 889, 891 (5th Cir. 1965); Commissionerv. Segall, 114 F.2d 706, 709-10 (6th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941).
86. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
87. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
88. E.g., United States v. Battley, 969 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1992); In re
Terwillinger's Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub
nom., Ohio Dep't of Taxationv. IRS, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); 21 WestLancaster Corp.
v. Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 790 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986); JFWIRS, Ltd. v. United
States, 607 F. Supp. 566, 568-70 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Note, Property Subject to the
Federal Tax Lien, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1487 (1964).
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is more than just the physical thing-the land, the bricks, the mortar-it is
also the sum of all the rights and powers incident to ownership of the physical
thing. It is the tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of
constituent elements."89
Thus, the tax law and modem conceptions of property dance to the same
beat: Whether an interest constitutes "property" depends, not on labels, but
on the actual benefits, burdens, and powers which the interest-holder
possesses.90
2. Substantive analysis of entireties interests
When the discussion is moved from the plane of legal fictions to the
plane of substance, it cannot seriously be denied that each spouse's entireties
interest constitutes "property or rights to property." Each spouse has
significant affirmative rights, veto rights, and contingent rights as to the use
to which the underlying physical property is put. For instance, in various bar
states:
(1) Each spouse has the absolute right to occupy and use all the property
held by the entireties estate.91 This present right of occupancy and use, by
itself, suffices to establish entireties interests as property rights.'
89. Dickmanv. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (quoting Passailaigue
v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963)); see also Randall v. H.
Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 271, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1976) (in holding that the
federal tax lien attached to rights under an executory contract, criticizing viewing
property "as though it were a metaphysical problem, as though 'legal title' were some
noumenal quality" and stating: "we recognize that property is an expanding concept
.... 'Property' is not to be confined in a juridical straitjacket.").
90. The Supreme Court already has applied such a substance-based approach to
taxation of entireties interests in another context. The gross estate on which the federal
estate tax is imposed has long included the decedent's interest in any property owned
by the entireties. See I.R.C. § 2040(b) (1994). In the course of challenging a
predecessor of § 2040, a taxpayer relied on another fiction associated with the
entireties form. The taxpayer argued that, since each entireties spouse is deemed to
own all of the property from the beginning of the entireties estate, nothing passed to
the surviving spouse as a result of the decedent's death. The Court rejected this
argument, stating: "The power of taxation is ... not to be restricted by mere legal
fictions. Whether that power has been properly exercised in the present instance must
be determined by the actual results brought about by the death, rather than by a
consideration of the artificial rules which delimit the title, rights, and powers of tenants
by the entirety at common law." Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930).
91. E.g., Yarde v. Yarde, 71 N.E.2d 625, 625 (Ind. App. 1947).
92. See Dickman, 465 U.S. at 336 ("We have little difficulty accepting the
theory that the use of valuable property ... is itself a protectible property interest.").
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(2) Each spouse has the right to share equally in any income produced
by the entireties property and, if the property is sold, to share equally in the
proceeds of sale.' If the other spouse withholds a spouse's share of such
income or proceeds, the aggrieved spouse has the right to sue the other spouse
for an accounting.94
(3) If entireties property is insured and has been wrongfully destroyed
by the other spouse, the nonculpable spouse has the right to recover one-half
of the insurance proceeds.95
(4) Each spouse has the right to improve the property held by the
entireties estate.9"
(5) Each spouse has the right to bring suit against others for torts
committed with respect to the property.'
(6) Each spouse has the right to accept payment from and to discharge
obligees with respect to the property.9"
(7) Each spouse has the right to prevent the disposition of the property,
whether by sale, gift, or devise.99
(8) Each spouse has the right to terminate the entireties estate by
agreement with her cotenant and to divide the underlying property.'
(9) Divorce converts a tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in
common by operation of law.' Thus, each spouse has the right to become
a tenant in common contingent on divorce.
(10) Each spouse has a right of survivorship, the right to become fee
simple owner of the property contingent on the death of the other spouse."°
These are many and substantial sticks in the bundle of ownership. As the
courts have emphasized, "it is the substance of the state law that is relevant
93. E.g., Perry v. Perry, 341 S.E.2d 53, 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 357 S.E.2d 925 (N.C. 1987).
94. E.g., Lacker v. Zuem, 109 So. 2d 180, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Pieretti v. Seigling, 34 A.2d 286, 288 (N.J. Ch. 1943).
95. E.g., Lewis v. Homeowners Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
96. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.12 (West 1994).
97. E.g., Sheldon v. Waters, 168 F.2d 483, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1948).
98. E.g., Gerson v. Broward County Title Co., 116 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959).
99. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 485 F.2d 606, 612-13 (Ct. Cl. 1973); In re
Jeffers, 3 B.R. 49, 52-53 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
100. E.g., Runco v. Ostroski, 65 A.2d 399, 400 (Pa. 1949).
101. E.g., Sebold v. Sebold, 444 F.2d 864, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Smith v.
Smith, 107 S.E.2d 530, 534 (N.C. 1959); MICH. COIp. LAws ANN. § 552.102 (West
1988).
102. E.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 350-51 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947 (1991).
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[for lien attachment purposes] and not any labels that a state or the parties
might attach to that substance.""°3 Thus, it is highly germane to § 6321 that
state law confers on the tax-delinquent entireties spouse the substantial "sticks"
described above, but it is not germane whether state law confers the term
"owner" on that spouse.
3. Analogies
Whether entireties interests are, judged by their substance, "property or
rights to property" need not be considered in a vacuum. The treatment of
entireties interests in several contexts outside of tax collection confirms that
such interests are legally cognizable property rights. For instance:
(1) Consider the treatment for income tax purposes of income generated
by entireties property. If one took seriously the idea that the property is
owned by neither spouse but only by some legal entity (their marital union),
the law would require that entity to file a tax return reporting that income (as
trusts and corporations do).. or to file an information return (as partnerships
do)."°5 At a minimum, it Would require the spouses to report the income on
a joint return.
The law does not, however. Instead, it is well established that income
from entireties property may be reported by the spouses on separate returns.
If the spouses file separate returns, each of them must report one-half of the
income from the entireties property. 6 It would be anomalous to say that
each spouse is sufficiently connected to property to have to pay tax on income
from it but is not sufficiently connected to it to have a property interest.
(2) Under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property."'" When only one spouse
is in bankruptcy, the majority view is that this rule sweeps that spouse's
interest in an entireties estate into the bankruptcy estate."0 8
103. Keeter v. United States, 461 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1972).
104. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2), (4) (1994).
105. I.R.C. § 6031(a) (1994).
106. E.g., Morgan v. Finnegan, 87 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Mo. 1949), aff'd, 182
F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1950); Cox v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-326, 66 T.C.M.
(CCII) 192, 194-95.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
108. See, e.g., In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1985);
Chippenham Hosp. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir. 1983); Napotnik v.
Equibank & Parkvale Savings Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir. 1982); Greenblatt v.
Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), aff'g In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1980).
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Other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may permit the debtor to
subsequently exclude the entireties interest from the bankruptcy estate." 9
However, for present purposes-for ascertaining whether entirety interests
should be deemed "property or rights to property"-the instructive fact is that
such interests are within "legal and equitable interests . . . in property" as
defined under the Bankruptcy Code.
(3) To further deter and punish illegal conduct, Congress has, in a
number of statutes, supplemented traditional fines and imprisonment with
property forfeitures."' However, Congress did not wish the fight against
crime to go so far as to harm innocent co-owners of otherwise forfeitable
property. One of the most frequently litigated forfeiture provisions reflects
these conflicting purposes:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest..., which is used
* . . to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter...
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner."'
Considerable judicial attention has been paid in recent years to the
operation of this provision when one spouse uses property held by the
entireties to facilitate an illegal purpose but the other spouse is uninvolved in
and ignorant of that conduct.11 The cases in that area further suggest that
entireties spouses have property interests.
109. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(A), (B) (1994). These other provisions exist
because Congress chose to allow elective incorporation of state exemptions into the
Bankruptcy Code, an incorporation not made in the Internal Revenue Code. See supra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 853, § 881 (1994).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994).
112. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 North Bay Road, 13 F.3d 1493, 1495
(1lth Cir. 1994); United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 972 F.2d 136, 137-38 (6th Cir.
1992) [Leroy Lane /]; United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 74-78 (3d
Cir. 1991). See generally Barbara W. Sharp, Comment, Losing Sticks from the
Bundle: Incompatibility of Tenancy by the Entireties & Drug Forfeiture Laws, 8
B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 197 (1993).
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Were the fiction that neither spouse owns the entireties property to be
applied, entireties spouses could not be considered "owners" for forfeiture
purposes. Yet, none of the forfeiture cases has taken this view. Indeed, it has
been held both that the spouse involved in the illegality has an interest which
she forfeits to the government 1 3 and that the other spouse has "the requisite
ownership interest" to have standing to assert the innocent-owner defense
against forfeiture.'
For purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 881, "owner" encompasses any person with
a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized." 5 Thus, to
hold that each spouse is an owner for forfeiture purposes is to hold that each
spouse has a recognizable legal or equitable interest in entireties property.
In summary, it cannot reasonably be argued that an entireties spouse has
no property interest as to entireties property. That notion has broken down as
a matter of form. More importantly, both federal taxation and contemporary
concepts of property advert to substantive powers, not to formalities of title,
and entireties spouses have many and substantial powers over entireties
property. Also, analogies from several contexts reinforce that entireties
interests are property rights.
4. Nature of property interest
In light of the hopelessness of a contention that entireties cotenants have
no rights in the property at all, cases as early as Hutcherson have maintained
alternatively that the property rights possessed by entireties spouses are only
undivided rights, not separate rights." 6 There are three problems with this
position.
First, the characterization appears not to be true as to all bar states. It is
appropriate to distinguish between the underlying asset and the entirety estate
which holds the asset. Each spouse, while having only an undivided interest
in the underlying asset, has a separate interest in the entirety estate." 7
113. E.g., United States v. Jimerson, 5 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam).
114. United States v. 717 South Woodard St., 804 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
115. Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles R & 11, 124 CONG. REc. S 17647,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522.
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. For example, in Florida, "[a]n estate by the entireties is held by the
husband and wife as one estate, therefore such estate is not the separate property of a
married woman; nor is it the property of the husband; but the interest or property
rights which a married woman has in an estate by the entireties held by her and her
husband during his life is her separateproperty... and the interest the husband has
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Second, in another way, the "only an undivided interest" characterization
is wrong as to all states. As to the underlying property, each spouse has two
interests. Each spouse has a present right to use the property. Also, each
spouse has a future, contingent right: the right to become the fee simple
owner of the whole property should the other spouse die first. The present
right is undivided, but the future, contingent right is separate.
Thus, each tax delinquent who is an entireties cotenant does have at least
some separate property right: the future, contingent right."' It is well
established that the federal tax lien attaches to contingent property
interests." 9 On this ground alone, the tax lien should attach to entireties
property.
Third, there is an even more fundamental point. Assume, contrary to the
foregoing, that in all states entireties interests are, in all respects, undivided
interests only. That fact would be irrelevant for tax lien attachment purposes
under the plain language of the statute.120
in such an estate is his property." Newman v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 160
So. 745,747 (Fla. 1935) (emphasis added); see, e.g., DePuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc.,
231 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) ("a married woman's interest or property
right in an estate by the entireties is her separateproperty") (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 238 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1970).
In Michigan, a spouse's interest in the underlying property is inchoate during the
existence of the entireties estate but "each spouse's survivorship interest is distinct,
cognizable, and sufficient to support attachment of a creditor's lien." Fischre v. United
States, 852 F. Supp. 628, 630 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
In Pennsylvania, a tenancy by the entireties has been analogized to a corporate
entity. See C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, 5 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. 1939); see also William Plumb,
Federal Liens & Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 636
& n.206 (1968). A stockholder in a corporation, of course, has no separate right in
the assets owned by the corporation, but her interest in the corporation (i.e., her stock)
is her separate property.
118. Indeed, depending on the relative life expectancies of the spouses, the
separate contingent right may be economically more valuable than the undivided
present right. For instance, for the younger spouse of an aged person or for the
healthy spouse of a terminally ill person, the foreseeable prospect of becoming sole
owner of the whole property may be worth more than the present right to use the
property.
119. E.g., United States v. Solheim, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 50,108 (D.
Neb. 1991); Bigheart Pipeline Co. v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 50, 53 (N.D. Okla.
1984), aff'd, 835 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d
1264, 1268-69 (8th Cir. 1972); Seaboard Surety Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 855,
859 (9th Cir. 1962); Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Nev. 1974).
120. Although the precise role of literal language in statutory interpretation is
debated, see, e.g., William D. Popkin, An 'Internal'Critique ofJustice Scalia's Theory
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Section 6321 says that the tax lien attaches to "all property and rights to
property" of the tax delinquent."' The statute does not say "all separate
fights to property," and it does not say "all rights to property except undivided
rights."
The Supreme Court has taught that § 6321 should be taken at face value.
For § 6321 purposes, "all" means "all."122 Thus, "all property and rights to
property" encompasses all undivided property interests as surely as it does all
separate property interests. Indeed, when addressing undivided property
interests outside the entireties context, courts have held the federal tax lien to
attach.
12
The characterof a propertyinterest-separateversus undivided-certainly
is germane for valuation purposes. Other things being equal, a separate
interest has a higher value than an undivided interest. As to whether the tax
lien attaches in the first place, however, the character of the property interest
is not pertinent. What matters is whether the tax delinquent spouse has a
property interest, not what the nature of that property interest is.1
24
Thus, (1) in at least some bar states, entireties cotenants have separate,
present property interests; (2) in all entireties states, such cotenants have
of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. RnV. 1133 (1992), the Supreme Court has
several times observed that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive
except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters." United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
121. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994) (emphasis added).
122. E.g., United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720
(1985) (the language of § 6321 "reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every
interest in property that ataxpayer might have"); Glass City Bankv. United States, 326
U.S. 265, 267 (1945) ("Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal
a purpose to assure the collection of tax."); see also In re Voelker, 42 F.3 d 1050, 1051
(7th Cir. 1994) ("The language of [§ 6321] unambiguously shows that the federal tax
lien attaches to all of the debtor's property, without exception."); Medaris v. United
States, 884 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1989).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 685 (1983) (federal tax
lien attaches to Texas homestead rights and Texas homestead property may be sold to
satisfy the separate tax debts of one spouse despite the fact that that spouse had only
an undivided interest in the homestead property); Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d
1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1972) (RS may levy on Texas community property to satisfy
antenuptial federal tax debt of one spouse); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142,
1146-47 (9th Cir. 1970) (federal tax lien attaches to undivided Washington State
community property interests).
124. Cf Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 337 (1984) (for gift tax
purposes, the "uncertain tenure [of a demand loan] may reduce its value, but it does
not undermine its status as property").
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separate, contingent property interests sufficient for tax lien attachment; and
(3) in any event, the "separate versus undivided" characterizationis irrelevant
for § 6321 purposes.
There is a variant on the "only an undivided interest" rationale. It has
sometimes been argued that the inability of either spouse unilaterally to
alienate the entireties property is an attribute inherent in each spouse's
property interest. In this view, the inability of the tax-delinquent spouse to
convey the property to anyone but his spouse (including his inability to
convey it to the IRS) is part and parcel of the property interest he
possesses.125
But such an argument is mere logomachy. An exemption remains an
exemption even when dressed up as an "attribute inherent in the property
interest."
In United States v. Rodgers,'26 the Supreme Court held that the IRS
could subject to enforced collection the homestead interest of a spouse even
though the local law protections and limitations as to homestead property were
comparable to such protections and limitations as to entireties property in the
bar states. The Supreme Court did not hold that these protections defined the
homestead spouse's rights, or that the property interests intrinsically contained
and were limited by these protections. 2 The argument should have no
greater play for entireties interests than for homestead interests.
Similar examples could be multiplied. For example, state law provisions
restricting what beneficiaries can demand or receive from spendthrift trusts
and restricting the ability of the beneficiaries' creditors to reach trust assets
could, with equal facility to bar restrictions, be considered attributes inherent
in the beneficiaries' interests in the trusts. Yet, the federal tax lien attaches
to beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts.'
In summary, as a matter of substance, state law gives each spouse
important powers and controls as to entireties property. Tax-delinquent
entireties spouses have "property or rights to property," and the separate or
125. See, e.g., John F. Hemandez, The Federal Tax Lien: Beyond United States
v. Rodgers, 36 FLA. L. REV. 1081, 1086 (1984) ("when state law either prohibits the
tax debtor, acting alone, from selling the property, or when it prohibits a third party's
interest from being affected by debts incurred solely by the tax debtor [, t]hese
protections, rather than acting as mere state-created exemptions, are inherent in the
state-defined property interest").
126. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
127. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. To similar effect, see
United States v. Weitzner, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCI) 9527 (S.D. Fla. 1961), aff'd,
309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963) (Florida homestead
property).
128. E.g., United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582, 584-85 (5th Cir.
1945); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. M11. 986).
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undivided character of such rights is irrelevant for lien attachment purposes.
Thus, the entireties bar cannot be supported under the first portion of the two-
part formulation governing federal tax collection issues. Because it cannot be
supported under the second portion either, the entireties bar is inconsistent
with the established rule governing federal tax collection.
C. Recent Supreme Court Teaching
As suggested by the foregoing, the bar cases (1) emphasize formalities
of title over realities of control and (2) misconstrue the rule relating state law
to federal tax lien analysis.'2 9 As to the second of these errors, at least, the
early bar decisions-while wrong-once again are easier to excuse than the
more recent bar decisions.
Although the Supreme Court has invoked the two-part rule since the
1930s, 3' it has done so through different, and occasionally sloppy,
language.' Moreover, in one federal tax collection decision, the Supreme
Court inexplicably neglected to employ the established two-part rule at all and
instead expressed concern about "the severe dislocation to local property
relationships which would result from our disregarding state procedures."' 32
With the Supreme Court sending ambiguous signals, it is not extraordinary
that bar cases of the 1950s and 1960s were decided as they were. 3
However, tax lien law has not been in hibernation since then. The key
decisions shaping our contemporary understanding of the federal tax lien are
129. United States v. Gurley, 415 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1969), illustrates both
tendencies. First, the court observed that "[a]n estate by the entireties is an almost
metaphysical concept," id. at 149, yet it analyzed the case within the framework of
entireties fictions rather than with reference to actual powers and controls over the
property. Second, the court stated: "in matters involving the creation and enforcement
of federal tax liens the Federal Courts respect those laws of a state which establish and
regulate property rights within the state," id. at 150, a rendition far more deferential
to state law than the two-part governing formulation is.
130. See supra note 66.
131. For example, in one case, the Court stated: "state law controls the
determination of what is included within... 'property or rights to property."' Meyer
v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963). This language could give the impression
that state law does more than merely create the powers or controls over property, that
it also defines whether those powers and controls should be characterized as property
rights, an impression that would be mistaken. See supra note 69.
132. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960).
133. See Randallv. H. Nakashima & Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir.
1976) (correctly applying the two-part rule but tracing the Supreme Court's
occasionally imprecise statements of it).
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the Supreme Court's 1980s decisions in United States v. Rodgers"' and
United States v. National Bank of Commerce."' The application of the two-
part formulation in Rodgers and National Bank of Commerce renders the
entireties bar hard to defend.
1. Rodgers
Rodgers involved two consolidated cases: United States v. Rogers and
Ingram v. Dallas Dep 't of Housing & Urban Rehabilitation.36 In the first
case, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers and her then husband acquired a residence,
which they occupied as their homestead. In 1971 and 1972, the IRS assessed
more than $927,000 of wagering taxes (plus interest and penalties) against the
husband, which remained unpaid as of his death in 1974. Lucille owed no
taxes.
137
After the husband's death, Lucille continued to occupy the property as
her homestead, with a new husband. In 1977, the government instituted suit
under § 7403 to enforce the tax lien against the homestead property.13 s
In the second case, Joerene and Donald Ingram, during their marriage,
acquired a residence, which they claimed as their homestead. In 1972 and
1973, the IRS, under § 6672, assessed employment taxes against Donald only
as a responsible person of a business. More than $9,000 of the assessments
(plus interest) remained unpaid. In 1973, the IRS assessed $283.33 of unpaid
income tax (plus interest) against Donald and Joerene jointly.'39
In 1975, while the Ingrains were in the process of divorcing, the house
on their homestead property was destroyed by fire. The insuran6e proceeds
were deposited with the local domestic relations court. Under their property
settlement agreement the Ingrams agreed to divide the proceeds equally.
Also, Donald agreed to convey his interest in the homestead property to
Joerene for $1,500, to be paid from amounts realized from selling the
property. Perhaps because of the federal tax liens on the property,40
Joerene was unable to sell the property. Joerene then sued to remove the tax
134. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
135. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
136. United States v. Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461
U.S. 677 (1983); Ingram v. Dallas Dep't of Hous. & Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F.2d
1128 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 461 U.S. 677 (1983). The taxpayer's surname was
misspelled in the caption of the first of these cases.
137. Rodgers, 641 U.S. at 687.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 688.
140. Id.
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liens from the property. During the litigation and pursuant to stipulation of
the parties, the property was sold and the sale proceeds put into escrow."'
The principal holding of the Supreme Court was that § 7403 applied, i.e.,
that the Rodgers property could be sold under, and the Ingram escrow could
be divided under, § 7403 despite the homestead status and protections afforded
by local law.142 Necessarily, this holding means that the federal tax lien
attaches to homestead interests because § 7403 operates only when the tax lien
is in place as to at least one of the co-owners' interests in the property.'43
Rodgers erodes the foundations on which the bar cases rest. As described
by the Supreme Court, Texas law contains a formidable set of protections for
homestead property:
--With certain exceptions not here relevant, Texas homestead property
is "protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts . . . . No
mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid."
1 44
-- "IT]he owner or claimant of the property [may not], if married, sell or
abandon the homestead without the consent of the other spouse.'
145
-On the death of either spouse, the homestead property "shall not be
partitioned among the heirs of the deceased during the lifetime of the
surviving husband or wife, or so long as the survivor may elect to use or
occupy the same as a homestead.'
4 6
The Court concluded:
The effect of these provisions of the Texas Constitution is to give each
spouse in a marriage a separate and undivided possessory interest in the
homestead, which is only lost by death or abandonment, and which may not
be compromised either by the other spouse or by his or her heirs.'47
141. Id. at 689.
142. Id. at 690-703. Secondarily, the Court held that district courts have limited
equitable discretion to refuse § 7403 sale and division, id. at 703-13, although it
emphasized that such discretion "shouldbe exercised rigorously and sparingly, keeping
in mind the Government's paramount interest in prompt and certain collection of
delinquent taxes." Id. at 711.
143. Section 7403(a) authorizes a civil action "to enforce the [tax] lien of the
United States." I.R.C. § 7403(a) (1994). The Court noted: "As a general matter, the
'lien of the United States' referred to in § 7403(a) is that created by [I.R.C.] § 6321."
Id. at 681.
144. Id. at 682 (quoting Tx. CONST. art. 16, § 50).
145. Id. at 684-85 (quoting TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 50).
146. Id. at 685 (quoting Tax. CONST. art. 16, § 52).
147. Id. There are two intertwined aspects here: "One [of these] is that these
laws confer a mere privilege of exemption, which operates to prevent the use of the
process of the court to sell certain property for the payment of debts. The other is that
the homestead right is considered an estate in land vested in the person designated by
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There is no meaningful difference between Texas homestead interests as
described by the Supreme Court and entireties interests as described by the bar
cases. Tax-delinquent Texas spouses have no greater ability to alienate
homestead property than tax-delinquent entireties spouses have to alienate
entireties property.
Rodgers applied the two-part rule'48 and taught that, under it, the
federal tax lien attaches to homestead interests even when only one spouse
owes taxes and even when local law prevents separate creditors of one spouse
from reaching the property. Given the comparable protections of homestead
property under the Texas Constitution and of entireties property in the bar
states, the inference from Rodgers is that the federal tax lien should attach to
entireties interests also, even in the bar states.
This inference is fortified by dicta in Rodgers addressing the entireties
bar directly. The dissent-correctly describing an entireties interest as "a
spousal property interest similar to the Texas homestead"' 49-- argued that
commentators 5 0 as well as the bar cases had taken the view that entireties
property "could not be sold to enforce the tax liability of one spouse."''
The dissent also noted that in 1954 a measure had passed the House of
Representatives that would have expressly provided that the § 6321 tax lien
embraces "the taxpayer's interest as tenant by the entirety" but that the Senate
had not agreed to the measure."'
The Rodgers majority addressed these points in a footnote. Although
these remarks were dicta, three facets of the footnote undermine the leading
bar cases:
(1) In the course of its discussion, the majority said: "if the tenancy by
the entirety cases are correct . . . . s3 By italicizing "if," the Rodgers
majority suggested it was not convinced that the key bar cases were correctly
decided.
law." Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 19 S.W.2d 35, 35 (Tex. 1929), quoted by
Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d at 1126-27; see Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 686.
148. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683. The circuit court had acknowledged this rule
as well, but incorrectly concluded that, under federal law, the tax lien does not attach
to homestead interests. See also Rogers [sic], 649 F.2d at 1120-28.
149. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 719 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. Paul E. Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Nature& Priority, 41 CAL. L. REV.
241, 254 (1953); Samuel 0. Clark, Jr., Federal Tax Liens & Their Enforcement, 33
VA. L. REV. 13, 17 (1947); see also Plumb, supra note 117, at 634-41.
151. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 719.
152. Id. at 720; see H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
153. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703 n.31 (emphasis in original).
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(2) As noted in Part I.C, the seminal bar cases could be read as resting
on any or all of several different rationales. 54 In its "if' discussion, the
majority interpreted the bar cases as being based on the notion that an
entireties spouse does not possess an independent property interest.155 As
shown above, such a rationale cannot be defended. 56 Thus, to the extent
that Rodgers reads the bar cases as depending on that rationale and not others,
Rodgers puts the bar cases on thin ice.
(3) The reading given by the Rodgers majority to the legislative events
of 1954 suggests that the federal tax lien already attaches to entireties
interests. The House bill was not an attempt to change § 6321 to extend the
tax lien to interests not previously within its ambit. Instead, the bill sought
merely to "clarify] the term 'property and rights to property' by expressly
including therein the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the
entirety.' 157  In the Court's view, the Senate rejected the House's
clarification "not necessarily because it disagreed with it, but more likely
because it found it superfluous.' 58
If amending § 6321 to state that the federal tax lien attaches to tenancy-
by-the-entireties interests would be "superfluous," then § 6321 already
encompasses such interests. Thus, the Rodgers majority's reading of the
legislative history suggests that the entireties bar is inconsistent with the intent
of Congress.
In summary, Rodgers confirms that, under the controlling two-part rule,
the federal tax lien reaches property interests not meaningfully distinguishable
154. See supra text accompanying notes 17-33.
155. The basic holding of the [bar cases] was, not merely that interests in a
tenancy by the entirety could not be sold to satisfy a tax debt of one spouse,
but that, as a result of the peculiar legal fiction governing tenancies by the
entirety in some States, no tax lien could attach in the first place because
neither spouse possessed an independent interest in the property.... Thus,
if the tenancy by the entirety cases are correct, they do no more than
illustrate the proposition that, in the tax enforcement context, federal law
governs the consequences that attach to property interests, but state law
governs whether any property interests exist in the first place.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703 n.31 (emphasis in original).
156. See also infra notes 161-169 and accompanying text (showing that this
rationale is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's teaching in National Bank of
Commerce).
157. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 703 n.31 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A406 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4554) (emphasis added
by the Court).
158. Id.; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1954) ("It is not clear
what change in existing law would be made by the [House's provision]. The deletion
of the phrase is intended to continue the existing law.").
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from entireties interests. Moreover, its discussion of the foundational bar
cases and the legislative history further suggests that the tax lien does attach
to entireties interests.
2. National Bank of Commerce
Two years after it decided Rodgers, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in United States v. National Bank of Commerce."9 The IRS had
assessed additional income taxes (plus interest and penalties) against Roy
Reeves, and part of the assessments remained unpaid.
Roy, his wife (Neva), and his mother (Ruby) were codepositors in two
bank accounts. 6 ' The record did not disclose which of them owned the
funds in the accounts, or in what proportions. Indeed, the court did not know
that any of the funds in the accounts belonged to Roy.' Nonetheless,
under then effective local (Arkansas) law, each of the codepositors had the
right to withdraw the full amounts in the accounts without notice to, or
consent by, the other codepositors. 16'
The IRS sought to obtain the funds in the accounts up to the amount of
the unpaid assessments through administrative levy under § 6331. To this
end, it served a notice of levy on the bank. The bank, maintaining that it did
not know how much of the money in the accounts belonged to Roy (as
opposed to Ruby and Neva), refused to honor the levy.'63
The government brought suit against the bank, contending that the IRS
stood in Roy's shoes under § 6331 and so could exercise Roy's right to
withdraw the amounts from the accounts. The district court and the appellate
court held that the Service could not levy on the accounts without establishing
how much of them each codepositor owned.6" Although rejecting the
availability of a § 6331 levy, both lower courts would have permitted the IRS
to bring suit under § 7403 to foreclose the tax lien against the accounts. 6
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the § 6331 levy. The majority
stressed that administrative levy, unlike § 7403 lien foreclosure, is a
159. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
160. Id. at 715-16.
161. Id. at 717 (majority opinion) & 735 (dissenting opinion).
162. Id. at 723 (citing former ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 67-521 & 67-552 (Michie
1980)).
163. Id. at 716.
164. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Ark.
1982), affd, 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
165. National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. at 116; 726 F.2d at 1300.
Roy's wife and mother would have been joined in such a § 7403 suit. I.R.C.
§ 7403(b) (1994).
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provisional remedy only: the IRS gains temporary possession of the money
or property, retaining or selling it only if other interested parties are unable
to establish (administratively or through the courts) their ownership of the
property.66 The dissent- maintained that § 6331 was inappropriate but
apparently, like the courts below, would have permitted the government to
bring suit under § 7403 to foreclose the tax lien on the bank accounts.16
National Bank of Commerce implicated both aspects of the two-part
formulation. First, the Court spoke to what constitutes "property or property
rights" for tax lien purposes. It was not established that Roy had any right
under state law beyond a right to withdraw the money from the bank. That
right was a right against the bank and did not establish Roy's legal right to
retain the funds as against his codepositors 68 Yet, in the view of the
majority, that right to withdraw, without any ensuing legal possessory interest,
is a sufficient "string" on the property or "stick" from the bundle of rights to
authorize attachment of the tax lien.'69
Spouses clearly have thicker strings or heavier sticks as to entireties
property than Roy had as to the bank accounts.1 For instance, entireties
spouses do have a legal possessory interest: They have an absolute right to
occupy and use the property held by the entireties estate.'
166. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 721.
167. See id. at 735-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
168. E.g., Blackv. Black, 135 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Ark. 1940). Thus, had Roy
withdrawn the funds and kept them but the true owner of the funds was his wife, his
mother, or a combination of them, these codepositors could have sued Roy for
conversion. See National Bank of Commerce,726 F.2d at 1295.
169. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 724. It is not entirely clear that
the dissent disagreed with this view. The dissent did argue that the mere right of
withdrawal should not be viewed as property for § 6331 levy purposes, id. at 741-47
(Powell, J., dissenting), but it was silent as to the anterior question of whether it
constitutes property or rights to property for § 6321 lien attachment purposes.
Moreover, § 7403 suit is available only "to enforce the [tax] lien of the United
States ... or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in
which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax." I.R.C. § 7403(a)
(1994). In agreeing that § 7403 was available to the IRS, therefore, the dissent (as
well as the district and circuit courts) could be read as agreeing that the tax lien did
attach or, at least, that Roy had a property right (for § 6321 purposes though not for
§ 6331 purposes) as to the accounts.
170. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
171. E.g., PONVELL, supra note 13, at 622[4] (citing cases). This difference
might have satisfied the National Bank of Commerce dissenters as well. See National
Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 747 (reading prior cases as required that a tax
delinquent have a "right of possession" before she can be deemed to have "property
or rights to property" for levy purposes).
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Because entireties spouses have greater powers over property than the
power that was held to be "property or rights to property" in National Bank
of Commerce, the Supreme Court's teaching in that case suggests that the
entireties bar cannot be justified under the first portion of the two-part rule.
As to the second portion of the rule, National Bank ofCommercerejected
the proposition that state debtor-creditor rules can limit the federal tax lien.
Although Roy had an unqualified right to withdraw the amounts in the
accounts, local garnishment law would not have subrogated Roy's creditors to
that right. Instead, Roy's creditors would have been forced to bring suit for
the amounts, joining Roy's wife and his mother in the suit and having to
prove how much of the accounts belonged to each.'72 The Eighth Circuit
would have limited the IRS to rights like those of the creditors.
113
The National Bank ofCommercemajority criticized this approach for two
reasons. First, the Eighth Circuit's approach would have relegated the federal
government to the status (and so the remedies) of a private creditor, a status
to which the national "sovereign" is superior."
Second, the Eighth Circuit's approach would have applied state law
beyond the point at which recourse to state law should end. State law should
be used only to ascertain what powers as to property the tax debtor has. Once
that question is answered, recourse to state law ends and further questions are
matters of federal law. 75
Thus, having ascertained that Roy had a right as to property (the right to
withdraw the funds), the Eighth Circuit should have looked to federal law
(§ 6321) to determine whether the tax lien attached to that right and looked
to federal law (§ 6331) to determine whether the Service could
administratively levy on the accounts. It should not have looked to state
garnishment law to determine whether and how the IRS could proceed.'76
The parallel is clear. In the entireties context, one looks to local law to
ascertain whether the tax delinquent spouse has strings and powers with
respectto the property. Once it has been established that she does, attachment
of the federal tax lien depends solely on § 6321. It does not depend on what
remedies state law affords or denies to private creditors.
In addition to clarifying the controlling two-part formulation adversely
to the entireties bar, National Bank of Commerce erodes the notion that
attachment of the tax lien to entireties interests would be fundamentally unfair
to nondelinquent spouses. The Court noted the Eighth Circuit's
"understandable concern for Ruby's and Neva's property interests" but
172. E.g., Hayden v. Gardner, 381 S.W.2d 752 (Ark. 1964).
173. National Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d at 1295-96.
174. National Bank of Commerce,472 U.S. at 727.
175. Id. at 722-23.
176. Id. at 726-27.
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observed that Congress had crafted mechanisms by which they could vindicate
their interests after levy.'77 The Court instructed that the lower tribunals
should have respected the balance struck by Congress between the
government's need for prompt revenue collection and the interests of
nondebtor persons."'
In summary, federal tax collection cases are governed by a well
established two-part rule. The first part of that rule asks whether the taxpayer
has "property or rights to property." This inquiry turns on substance, not
formalities, and state law confers many significant powers over entireties
property to each of the spouses. The second part of the rule looks to federal
law exclusively, rendering irrelevant state principles preventing ordinary
separate creditors from proceeding against entireties property. Especially as
clarified by the Supreme Court in Rodgers and National Bank of Commerce,
the two-part formulation leaves no room for the entireties bar.
V. ENDING THE ENTmETIES BAR
As shown above, while the entireties bar was ill conceived from its
inception, its drawbacks-revenue erosion, unfairness, and doctrinal
confusion-have become even more glaring in light of developments since the
1950s and 1960s. The bar should be overthrown. The question now becomes
which mechanism-continued litigation or legislation-is the more promising
route by which to effect such overthrow.
In my view, Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and lower court
decisions in the 1990s provide a sufficient basis on which courts could
repudiate the entireties bar in future cases. Thus, the desired result may come
from case law evolution. Nonetheless, for reasons of speed and flexibility,
legislation is more likely to provide the ultimate answer.
A. Judicial Overthrow of the Bar
As we saw in Part IV.C, the Supreme Court's teaching in Rodgers and
National Bank of Commerce largely pulls the doctrinal rug out from under the
entireties bar. Indeed, one commentator-who also was the taxpayer's counsel
in Rodgers-remarked that, in view of that decision, "perhaps it is only a
matter of time" before a spouse's entireties interest is held subject to
attachment by the IRS as a result of his individual tax liabilities. 79
177. Id. at 728; see I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1994) (administrative authority to return
property wrongfully levied on) and I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1) (1994) (wrongful levy suits by
persons other than the tax delinquent).
178. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 729.
179. WiLLL iv D. ELLIOTr, FEnmzAL TAX COLLECTIONS, LENs & L vms 9-92
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Of course, the digestive process of the law is not remarkable for its
alacrity. That being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that most lower court
cases afterRodgers and National Bank of Commercehave followed the old bar
decisions and have failed to discuss the Supreme Court decisions in any
careful or detailed manner."' 0 However, two recent cases-the Tax Court's
1991 decision Philips v. Commissioner' and the Western District of
Michigan's 1994 decision Craft v. United States---are encouraging.
1. Philips
As detailed in Part II, tenancies by the entireties can be used as a planned
mechanism for tax avoidance." The taxpayers' actions in Philips strikingly
resembled the program described in Part II.
Benjamin Philips, Jr., was a physician; his wife, Carolyn, was not
employed outside the home. They resided in Florida, a bar state, and had
their property there. The Philipses filed income tax returns on a "married
filing separately" basis. Carolyn filed correct returns. Benjamin had high
income from his medical practice, but, for nearly the entire decade of the
1970s, he offset much of that income by improper deductions from numerous
tax shelters."M
(2d ed. 1995); see also John F. Hemandez, The Federal Tax Lien: Beyond United
States v. Rodgers, 36 U. FLA- L. REV. 1081, 1098 (1984) ("Clearly, a literal reading
of section 7403 would invade the tenancy by the entirety sanctuary."); Terrence C.
Brown-Steiner, Comment, Federal Tax Liens & State Homestead Exemptions: The
Aftermath of United States v. Rodgers, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 297, 323 (1985) ("A strong
argument can be made thatRodgers does apply to tenancy-by-the-entirety situations.").
180. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 50,112,
at 87,454 (8th Cir. 1991) (discussingneither Supreme Court decision); Tony Thornton
Auction Service, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1986) (dicta)
(discussing neither Supreme Court decision); Talbot v. United States, 850 F. Supp.
969, 972-75 (D. Wyo. 1994) (discussing Rodgers incompletely and National Bank of
Commerce not at all); Carlson v. United States, 1989 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15842 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (discussing neither Supreme Court case).
181. T.C. Memo. 1991-56, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1883, aff'd without opinion, 978
F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1992). The author was trial counsel for the government in this
case. The description here of the facts of Philips is drawn from the pleadings and
decisions in this case and the transferor's prior Tax Court case: Docket No. 9158-79
(decision entered Feb. 19, 1986).
182. 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,493, supplemental opinion, 1995 WL
549317 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
183. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
184. Philips, 61 T.C.M. at 1883.
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The Service audited Benjamin's returns for 1973 through 1979 and
determined large deficiencies. Benjamin contested these determinations, but
the cases were eventually settled. Pursuant to the settlements, Benjamin
agreed that he owed additional income taxes of more than $387,000 for these
years. 1
5
The case concerned four assets: a $100,000 purchase money note, some
parcels of commercialreal estate, some vacant land, and the Philips' residence.
Benjamin had owned the first three of these assets in his individual capacity,
but, after the IRS began its investigation of his 1973-1979 tax returns, he first
conveyed them into tenancies by the entireties between himself and Carolyn,
then released his entireties interests to her, making her the sole owner of the
three assets.'
The residence had been acquired by the Philipses and held by them as
tenants by the entireties before 1973. However, again after the start of the
IRS audit, Benjamin conveyed his interest in it to Carolyn, making her sole
owner of the residence-although Benjamin continued to live there with
her.'17
As he had divested himself of his assets, the Service could not collect
Benjamin's large tax liabilities from him. Accordingly, the Service asserted
that Carolyn was liable as a transferee from Benjamin to the extent of the full
value of the formerly separately owned assets and one-half of the value of the
residence."a
The Tax Court held that the transfer of Benjamin's entireties interest in
the residence did not give rise to transferee liability because, under Florida
entireties law, he had no independent interest in the property at any time when
he owed taxes.'89 However, the court held that the transfer of the three
other assets into entireties form did render Carolyn liable as a transferee.19
The latter holding represents a deep fissure in the once solid entireties
wall. As to the three assets, Carolyn argued that she could not be held liable
as a transferee because she had received nothing. Relying on Florida entireties
185. Id. This amount includes penalties but does not include interest, which,
considering the vintage of the case, would have multiplied the liability several fold.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1884.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1886. In so holding, the Tax Court gave encouragement to taxpayers
using the scheme of abuse described in Part II. As long as the entireties bar can be
used as "audit insurance" for aggressive tax reporting, married taxpayers in bar states
will have a standing invitation to underpay their taxes.
190. Id. at 1885.
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law, she argued that the marital union, not she, was the transferee.'91 The
Tax Court rejected her argument, holding that
[Carolyn] received an interest in property when the entireties estates were
created.... The fact that one spouse's interest is not wholly independent
of the other's does not render that interest a nullity. We therefore dismiss
as overly formalistic [Carolyn's] argument that only the entireties estate, as
a separate entity, received a property interest. A tenancy by the entireties
is not a juridical person, separate from the identities of the tenants
themselves."92
This holding was the first express recognition in any tax collection case
that an entireties interest in a bar state is a property interest.'"
2. Craft
The origins of Craft-a tax lien decision-lie in the cases testing when
entireties interests can be forfeited as a result of criminal activity,'
particularly the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. 2525 Leroy
Lane.'95 Leroy Lane I involved entireties property in Mvichigan, a bar state.
The husband had used the property in drug trafficking; the wife was an
innocent co-owner. The Sixth Circuit held, under the forfeiture provisions,
that "the Government would have a lien on the property to the extent of the
value of [the husband's] interest," that the wife could continue to use the
property while the entireties estates existed, and that proceeds upon sale of the
property would be divided between the United States and the wife.'96 In the
course of its opinion, the court remarked: "Under Michigan law, the
individual interest of a tenant by the entirety is the functional equivalent of a
191. Id. at 1885.
192. Id.
193. Furthermore, any additional supportthe case offers for the "no independent
interest" rationale is murky. Although that rationale was the basis of the court's
holding as to the residence, the above quoted language from the other holding included
the sentence: "The fact that one spouse's interest is not wholly independent of the
other's does not render that interest a nullity." Since the court conceded that even an
undivided interest is a property interest and since, under § 6321, the federal tax lien
attaches to all property interests, the "no independent interest" rationale for the bar is
shaky.
194. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
195. 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990) [Leroy Lane 1], cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947
(1991).
196. LeroyLane I, 910 F.2d at 351.
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life estate with a right of survivorship,"'" a clear statement that a spouse
does have a property interest as to entireties property.
In the spring of 1994, in Fischre v. United States, a district court applied
Leroy Lane I to a judgment lien obtained by the United States against one
spouse.19 The court discussed Cole v. Cardoza, an earlier Sixth Circuit
decision holding that the federal tax lien does not attach to Michigan entireties
property when only one spouse owes taxes, 9 and it concluded that Leroy
Lane I modified Cole.2"' In the court's view, although the underlying
property cannot be reached while the entireties estate remains intact,
each spouse's survivorship interest is distinct, cognizable, and sufficient to
support attachment of a creditor's lien .... Thus, under Michigan law, it
appears that ajudgment lien based on the sole obligation of one spouse may
legitimately attach to that spouse's individual survivorship interest in
entireties property without illegitimately burdening the entireties estate or
the other spouse's interest therein.2 '
In Craft, decided in the fall of 1994, Sandra and Don Craft purchased
Michigan real property as tenants by the entireties in 1972. Subsequently,
Don (but not Sandra) incurred income tax assessments exceeding $482,000 for
1979 through 1987. In March 1989 the IRS filed a notice of tax lien. In
August 1989 the property was transferred into Sandra's sole ownership.
Sandra later sold the property. Sandra claimed she was entitled to all of the
sale proceeds; the IRS claimed a portion of the proceeds based on Don's
interest in the property.2"
The court followed Leroy Lane I and Fischre. Concluding that the tax
lien attached to Don's interest, the court held that the IRS was entitled to a
portion of the sale proceeds corresponding to Don's one-half interest in the
property.2" So, Leroy Lane I, Fischre, and Craft not only recognize that
entireties spouses have property interests but also hold that government liens,
including the federal tax lien, can attach to those interests.
197. Id. at350. This is broadly similarto thewaythe Supreme Court described
Texas homestead interests. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 686 (1983).
198. 852 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Mich. 1994). The case does not make clear what
kind of liability gave rise to the judgment lien.
199. 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971).
200. Id.
201. Fischre, 852 F. Supp. at 630.
202. Craft, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,816.
203. Id. at 85,817-18. Craft was decided by the same court that rendered one
of the earliest bar opinions, Shaw v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mich.
1939). Craft does not discuss Shaw though it effectively overrules it.
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In summary, in the 1980s, in Rodgers and National Bank of Commerce,
the Supreme Court construed the federal tax lien in ways which, when applied
to the entireties area, fundamentallyundermine the bar decisions. In 1991, in
Philips, the Tax Court recognized that entireties interests are property
interests. In 1994, in Craft, a district court held that the federal tax lien can
attach to entireties interests even when only one spouse owes taxes. The case
law may be evolving toward rejection of the entireties bar. Courts deciding
future cases should confirm and advance that evolution.
B. Legislative Overthrow of the Bar
Despite this promising judicial evolution, legislation has some advantages
over continued litigation as the principal means by which to effect abrogation
of the bar. Many states, scattered among all the federal judicial circuits, have
the entireties bar.2"4 A decision by the Supreme Court would, of course,
have national effect, but the certiorari process is unpredictable."' Absent
Supreme Court resolution, attacking the entireties bar would entail multiple
cases in multiple courts, consuming years of time and multiplying expense.
A compounding factor in this regard is the doctrine of stare decisis.
Even though wisdom does not walk with the bar decisions, there are many of
them and they extend over two generations. In my view, the area already has
been destabilized by Rodgers, National Bank of Commerce, Philips, and Craft.
Yet, some judges might feel that adherence to what remains the overwhelming
bulk of the precedents requires following the old rule regardless of its
analytical unsoundness. Such a view would add to the difficulty of rooting
out the entireties bar through litigation.
In short, Congress-which can act once for the whole nation and which
is not bound by judicial precedents construing statutes-is the superior body
for completing the overthrow of the old rule. The wall should be toppled in
one stroke rather then dismantled brick-by-brick.
An additional consideration points in the same direction. Ending the bar
will bring to the fore "second generation" issues. Congress could resolve these
issues anticipatorily as part of the statutory amendment eliminating the bar.
Additional rounds of litigation would be needed to deal with the "second
generation" issues were the bar removed through the courts.
Two "second generation" issues are of principal importance: First, what
post-attachment options would the Service have in enforcing its lien against
204. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
205. In recent years, the Supreme Court has been hearing and deciding fewer
cases. See, e.g., William Banks, Supreme Court Report: At the Hafivay Point, 81
A.B.A.J. 50, 50 (Apr. 1995).
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the entireties property? Second, how would entireties interests be valued?
These issues are addressed below.
1. Post-Attachment Options
The mere existence of the tax lien on the entireties property sometimes
would lead to payment of the outstanding liabilities of the delinquent spouse.
For example, the spouses sometimes would want to pay the liability to remove
the lien's cloud on the property's title in order to more readily sell the
property. But, in other cases, such payment would not be forthcoming. In
those cases, the Service would want to be able to take enforced collection
action.
The two main enforced collection options available to the Service are:
(1) effecting administrative sale of the delinquent's property interest under
§ 6331(b) and (2) requesting a federal district court, under § 7403, to sell the
entire property in which the delinquent has an interest and divide the net
proceeds among the various owners, the IRS receiving the delinquent's share
up to the total of her outstanding liabilities.
As a practical matter, the first of these options would little avail the IRS
in most entireties cases. After sale of the other spouse's interest, the
nondelinquent spouse would retain all of her rights, both present and future.
The resultant divided ownership under, at best, tense circumstances would be
unattractive to most potential buyers. The IRS usually would receive no or
very low bids were it to try to sell the debtor spouse's interest only.
Thus, the core post-attachment question is this: Should the IRS be
allowed to proceed under § 7403 with respect to entireties property as it can
with respect to other types of jointly held property? Or, should solicitude for
the nondebtor spouse lead to the crafting of a special rule for entireties cases?
The likeliest candidate for such a special rule would be a "wait and see"
approach like the regime already in place in the modified bar states. That is,
the Service could be prohibited from attempting to partition or sell the
property during the existence of the marriage. What would happen thereafter
would depend on whether the marriage ended because of divorce or because
of death.
-By operation of law, divorce converts a tenancy by the entireties into
a tenancy in common." 6 When husband and wife are tenants in common,
the interests of either spouse can be reached by their separate creditors and are
subject to levy and sale on execution." 7
206. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
207. E.g., United States v. Estes, 654 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Michigan
State Bank v. Kern, 155 N.W. 502 (Mich. 1915). Ending an entireties estate by
agreement or by sale of the property would lead to a similar result. See Craft v.
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-The right of survivorship is an attribute of tenancies by the
entireties." 8 Thus, under the "wait and see" approach, were the tax-
delinquent spouse to die first, his interest in the property would be
extinguished and the Service would realize nothing. If, instead, the
nondelinquent spouse were to die first, the extinguishment of her interest
would leave the delinquent spouse the sole, fee simple owner of the property.
Then, the Service could proceed against the property as it can against any
separate property.
The forfeiture cases testing the innocent owner defense in the entireties
context?0 9 have not gone further than a "wait and see" approach: the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's interest without erosion of the innocent
spouse's continued use of the property and right of survivorship.21 The tax
lien case following the forfeiture cases took the same approach.2 '
Although even the "wait and see" approach would be an improvement
over the status quo, this article recommends that the normal § 7403
regime-the regime that applies to all other types of jointly owned
property-apply to entireties property after the lifting of the bar. Four reasons
support this recommendation:
(1) The normal regime typically will yield far more rapid closure than
would the "wait and see" approach. The prospect of uncertainty over years,
perhaps decades, before death or divorce occurs is uninviting.
(2) The "wait and see" approach would underserve the nation's revenue
interest. In cases in which the tax delinquent dies first, the Service's ability
to proceed against the property will be extinguished. The tax-delinquent
spouse would have had a valuable right-the right to occupy and use the
entireties property, perhaps for years-yet no tax will have been collected with
respect to that right.
(3) The "wait and see" approach also would underserve the objective of
equal treatment of taxpayers. Though reduced compared to the present
situation, preferential treatment-possible long use of the property and
United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,493, supplemental opinion, 1995 WL 549317
(W.D. Mich. 1995).
208. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 111-16 and accompanying text.
210. Compare Leroy Lane I, 910 F.2d at 351-52 (6th Cir. 1990) (government
has lien onthe property to extent of culpable spouse's interest but innocent spouse may
use property as an entireties tenant), with United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave.,
894 F.2d 1511, 1516 n.6 (llth Cir. 1990) (no lienbut government can file lis pendens)
and United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (remand
under instructions similar to Leroy Lane approach).
211. Craft v. United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,493, supplementalopinion,
1995 WL 549317 (W.D. Mich. 1995); cf Fischre v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 628
(W.D. Mich. 1994) (same approach with respect to judgment lien).
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possible ultimate avoidance of tax collection-still would be accorded citizens
holding entireties property over all other citizens.
(4) The analogy to the forfeiture cases is imperfect. The national interest
as to prompt and effective revenue collection exceeds that as to drug
forfeiture.212 More importantly, the existence of § 7403 distinguishes the
two contexts:
-While 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) directs that "no property [of an innocent
owner] shall be forfeited," § 7403 specifically authorizes the sale of property
in which both the tax delinquent and others have interests.213
-Section 7403 is carefully crafted to protect the interests of nondebtor
owners: all persons interested in the property must be joined in the action,
sale is effected "by a proper officer of the court," and sale proceeds are
distributed by the court among the various interest-holders in proportion to
their interests.214 No parallel protections exist in the forfeiture arena.
-One concern expressed by courts in the forfeiture context is that, were
forfeiture of the culpable spouse's interest to convert the estate into a
partitionable tenancyin common, the government would possess greaterpower
than the culpable spouse had while the property was in entireties form.2"
In contrast, by virtue of § 7403, the IRS may legally exert greater power over
property than the delinquent taxpayer had in it.2" 6
Thus, on balance, additionalprotection for nondelinquent spouses, beyond
that afforded by § 7403, is not necessary. Once the federal tax lien has
attached, the Service should be allowed to use the same tax collection options
in the entireties context as it is allowed to use in all other contexts.
2. Valuation
After overthrow of the entireties bar, valuing entireties interests will
matter for two reasons. First, when entireties property is sold pursuant to
§ 7403, valuation will be necessary to ensure that the nondelinquent spouse
receives the proper amount in the ensuing distribution of sale proceeds.
Second, taxpayers often attempt to "beat" the tax collectorby transferring their
assets to related individuals. One of the IRS's options in such cases is to seek
212. Although "there is a strong governmental interestin obtaining full recovery
of all forfeitable assets," Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
631 (1989), "taxes are the life-blood of government" and their collection is "an
imperious need," Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
213. I.R.C. § 7403 (1994).
214. I.R.C. § 7403(b) & (c) (1994).
215. See, e.g., United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1516
(llth Cir. 1990).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1983).
[Vol. 60
TEIANCY-BY-THE-ENTIRETJES JNTE1?STS
a money judgment from the transferee.2" The amount of such judgment
cannot exceed the fair market value of the transferred property (plus
interest)."' Thus, when a delinquent spouse, in order to defeat collection
of her tax liabilities, transfers her entireties interest to her nondelinquent
spouse, making him the fee simple owner of the property, measuring the
extent of his transferee liability requires valuing the interest his wife
transferred to him.
Three main options exist for valuing entireties interests. In ascending
order of desirability, they are: (1) judicial resolution on a facts-and-
circumstances basis, (2) judicial resolution based on the life expectancies of
the spouses, and (3) legislative resolution. For the reasons below, the
statutory amendment abrogating the entireties bar should provide that each
spouse's interest in an entireties estate be valued at fifty percent of the value
of the underlying property held by that estate.
Facts-and-circumstances valuation: Valuation is no stranger to tax
litigation. Thousands of cases and rulings have dealt with the value of diverse
types of property interests,2 and tens of thousands of valuation
controversies have been settled short of trial. While many situationally
apposite guidelines have developed, the general rule is that "[a]l relevant facts
and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date shall be considered
in every case.'22
Ragnarok would not be precipitated were we simply to add entireties
valuation issues to the judicial process without further guidance. Neither,
however, would that be the wisest course. Doing so would expend precious
judicial resources; it would multiply costs (attorneys fees and expert witness
fees) for both taxpayers and the government; and it often would occasion
years of delay in concluding tax controversies. Furthermore, at the end of that
long and painful road, participants often would feel less than confident that an
217. See I.R.C. § 6901 (1994).
218. E.g., Yagoda v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 170, 185 (1962), affd, 331 F.2d
485 (2d Cir. 1964).
219. For example, valuation is necessary to determine (i) the amount included
in gross income whenpayment is received in the form of property, not cash, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1960 as amended in 1989); (ii) the extent of deductions for
charitable contributions of property, see I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055 & 2522 (1994); (iii) the
amount by which property owned by the decedent increases the gross estate for estate
tax purposes, see I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1994); (iv) the amount of gifts (when made in
property) subject to the gift tax, see I.R.C. § 2512(a) (1994); and (v) the base for
imposition of certain penalties, see I.R.C. § 6662(e), (g) & (h) (1994).
220. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958 as amended in 1965).
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accurate result had been reached. Valuation is a notoriously imprecise
exercise, " and the courts possess no special expertise in performing it.
222
The inadequacies of judicial valuation under the general facts-and-
circumstances approach have engendered efforts to move tax valuation out of
the courts.2 It would run counter to those initiatives to throw entireties
valuation into the judicial mill.
Moreover, valuing entireties interests would be even more problematic
than many other valuation exercises. The touchstone of standard valuation
analysis is the price at which assets like those at issue commonly are sold in
their customary marketplace. 24 There is no established market for entireties
interests; except for rare interspousal sales, such interests are not bought and
sold. The restrictions and contingencies to which each entireties spouse's use
of and expectancies as to the property are subject, coupled with the absence
of an established market would make facts-and-circumstances judicial
valuation of entireties interests frustrating for all concerned.
Life expectancies valuation: One important feature of tenancies by the
entireties is the right of survivorship. This feature suggests a possible
valuation approach: By comparing the respective life expectancies of the
spouses on the valuation date, one could allocate the value of the property
between the spouses. For estate tax and other purposes, the Service has
developed a variety of mortality and actuarial tables that could be adapted for
this purpose,' and similar commercial tables exist.
This approach gains some force from dicta in Rodgers. The Court
"assume[d], only for the sake of illustration, that a homestead estate is the
exact economic equivalent of a life estate, and that the use of a standard
221. See, e.g., Commissionerv. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1942)
("almost always, 'value' involves a conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a prophecy");
Messingv. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967) (it is futile to attempt "to infuse
a talismanic precision into [valuation] ... which should frankly be recognized as
inherently imprecise").
222. E.g., Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441,
452 (1980) (judicial resolution of valuation issues expends the time, effort, and money
of the parties and of the court and is "not likely to produce a better result").
223. See, e.g., TAX CT. R. 124 (voluntary binding arbitration for valuation and
other factual issues); Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526,proposedmodifications, IRS
Announcement 95-49, 1995-24 I.R.B. 13 (advance pricing agreements for § 482); IRS
Notice 95-1, 1995-2 I.R.B. 15 (proposed revenue procedure for advance valuation of
certain contributions of art).
224. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958 as amended in 1965).
225. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7520 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7; IRS Notice 89-
60, 1989-1 C.B. 700; IRS Notice 89-24, 1989-1 C.B. 660.
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statutory or commercial table .... is appropriate in calculating the value of
that estate." 226
A life expectancies approach to valuing entireties interests would entail
less cost, delay, and uncertainty than a facts-and-circumstances approach.
Still, it would have at least two shortcomings. First, the exclusive emphasis
of a life expectancies approach would be distorting. The right of survivorship
is one important aspect of entireties ownership, but it is not the only one.
Second, even as to right of survivorship, significant uncertainties would
exist.227 For example, the Service's tables and commercial tables assume
hypothetical, average individuals. But, in each case, the spouses will be real
people who may diverge, sometimes greatly, from the averages. For instance,
assume John is 53 and in perfect health and Mary is 45 but in an advanced
stage of a terminal disease. Use of established tables would greatly overvalue
Mary's entireties interest.'
Statutory valuation: The height of certainty and simplicity would be a
fixed statutory valuation rule. I recommend that, in the amendment to § 6321
overthrowing the entireties bar, Congress prescribe that each cotenant's interest
in an entireties estate shall be valued at one-half of the value of the underlying
property held by that estate.
For state law purposes, fifty percent per spouse is already the "default"
valuation of entireties interests. Generally, spouses are allowed to end their
entireties estate by agreement and to divide the property between themselves
in any proportion they choose. If their agreement fails to state the proportion,
a fifty-fifty division will be made by the courts.2
More importantly, a fifty percent-fifty percent rule already is used for
several federal tax purposes. For example,
226. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 698 (1983) (emphasis in original).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 918 n.8 (D.N.J. 1995)
("unlike a life estate, the value of which can be predicted with the use of life
expectancy tables, the imprecise nature of an interest such as a right of survivorship
makes it less susceptible of valuation").
228. See, e.g., Rodgers,461 U.S. at 704. This problem with standardized tables
has beenrecognized, butnot filly satisfactorily resolved. See, e.g., Bank of California
v. United States, 672 F.2d 758, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1982); Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B.
194.
229. E.g., Sheldonv. Waters, 168 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1948); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75D-8 (1990) (50%-50% rule for state forfeiture purposes); Eric G.
Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety & Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse
Prevention & ControlAct: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 553 (1993) (urging
adoption of the North Carolina approach for federal forfeiture purposes).
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-For federal estate tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code directs that,
when one spouse dies, one-half of any property owned by the decedent and
her spouse as tenants by the entireties be included in her gross estate."0
-For income tax purposes, any rents, interest, or other income produced
by entireties property is taxed one-half to each spouse if they file separate
returns."l A similar rule applies as to deductions with respect to entireties
property. 2
Of course, the principal objection to a fifty-fifty statutory valuation is its
lack of calibration. However, this is hardly unique: often, a court can resolve
a valuation dispute "only by a Solomon-like pronouncement.""ui As noted
above, the approach recommended here simply applies to tax collection a
valuation convention as to entireties interests already used for estate and
income tax purposes. It is a sensible balance between convenience and
precision.
CONCLUSION
The entireties bar is a testament to the tendency of our legal system to
perpetuate antiquated rules long after their intellectual and practical
foundations have crumbled. Emanating from cases almost a half century old,
the bar survives despite the fact that the conceptions of property and of the
relation of federal to state law on which those cases were based have been
repudiated by more recent teaching.
The uncritical reaffirmation of the old bar cases by subsequent decisions
has left us with a rule which compromises the revenue, creates a ready
pathway for tax avoidance, defeats equal treatment of taxpayers, and lacks any
defensible doctrinal underpinning. The entireties bar should be abrogated.
MacBeth lamented: "Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player that
struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more. "" The
entireties bar is a walking shadow that has overstayed its hour in federal tax
lien analysis. It should be ushered off the stage.
230. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(1), (2)(A) (1994).
231. E.g., Morgan v. Finnegan, 87 F. Supp. 274, 278 (E.D. Mo. 1949), aff'd,
182 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1950).
232. E.g., Coxv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-326, 66 T.C.M. (CCi) 192.
233. Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967).
234. WLLAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act V, § v.
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